Setting the Table: The Retrieval of Civil Society
[1] It is no accident that Habermas revised his
sociological theory in the early 1990s by attending more closely to
civil society. Already before the 1989 collapse of the Soviet
Union, Central and Eastern European dissidents were focusing on the
renewal of civil society, even in the highly restricted versions in
which it existed within the Soviet field of influence. These
dissidents raised their fledgling democracies by nurturing
churches, unions, neighborhoods, movements, and
institutions.1
[2] In the United States, we have lived with civil society for
generations. In the decades since World War II, however, ordinary
people in their everyday lives have, more often than not, come to
take it for granted. The United States's entry into World War II
necessitated the cooperation of the two great systems of modern
life: the democratic state and the market economy. Our victories in
World War II had much to do - not everything, but much - with the
successful cooperation of these two systems under the leadership of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The collaborative success of the state and
the market in the war effort progressively lured, even seduced,
large numbers of ordinary Americans to fixate greatest attention
and energies on the so-called real world of economy and state,
impoverishing civil society as a valuable public space.
[3] This growing fixation on the democratic state and/or the
market economy draws on two of the rival Western heritages
formulated over the last two centuries. Each of these intellectual
heritages divulges a truth about the pursuit of the good life in
the contemporary era, but each does so too
one-sidedly.2
The first is the neoclassical republican tradition proposed by
Rousseau. This tradition highlights the moral agency of the
citizen, which has been a key idea for democratic idealism. In the
republican heritage, the constitutional nation-state is of highest
worth, and nation-state citizenship is the telos that all moral
agency must serve. The most telling criticism of this heritage does
not concern constitutional democratic politics. I would argue
vigorously that the democratic state is the best form for the
modern era. Habermas's analyses of the republican and liberal
models of the democratic state, however, help us see the
deficiencies that even democracies can perpetuate. Moreover, though
the democratic state touches ordinary living, it is not,
paradoxically, the everyday life of many ordinary people. Ordinary
people spend much of their time and energy earning a living.
[4] Earning a living points to the second great Western
heritage: the market capitalist tradition. This heritage spurns the
republican fixation on the democratic state and focuses instead on
the economy as the source of the good life; the marketplace is of
highest worth. With market as the root metaphor, even the moral
agency of economic production plays second fiddle to the
consumptive path. The autonomous agency of personal, private choice
satiates the spirit of the market heritage. Catering to the
consumptive, choosing appetite are the entrepreneurs, who, perhaps
more than consumers, are the ideal. In this laissez-faire system of
classic liberalism, economic production, consumption, and
entrepreneurship must remain liberated from the state. Even the
democratic state must keep its hands off the economy.
[5] The one-sidedness of the market capitalist heritage shows up
in at least two ways. A growing number come to the marketplace with
far too few resources to purchase or to produce the goods needed to
participate effectively in our globalized economic
life.3 Many,
and this number is also growing, come to the marketplace with
enough or even an abundance of consumptive and entrepreneurial
resources, but they do not find the good life. They find, instead,
a meaningless, even a "heartless world." Many in this latter group
search for a haven from the heartless world of the marketplace,
which is usually a cocoon like the nuclear family or the familially
fashioned congregation. Ironically, the familially fashioned
congregation provides a certain legitimacy for the normalcy of the
heartless economy and state. Disturbingly, far too many find the
private spaces to be equally, if not more, heartless than the
marketplace or the democratic state. Such heartlessness reveals
that our private spheres remain fragile and cannot flourish without
being rooted in and accountable to the broader moral networks and
wisdoms that saturate civil society.4 Furthermore, our private
spaces too easily become colonized by the consumptive strategies of
the marketplace and by the administrative necessities of the
democratic state.
[6] Tragically, neither the republican nor the market heritages
makes a theme of civil society, thus their one-sidedness. This
fact, coupled with our half-century fixation on either the
political or economic sphere, or even on some creative combination
of the two, helps impoverish the moral potentiality and political
significance of civil society. Finally, an impoverished civil
society deprives us of a thriving deliberative democracy, which is
essential for overcoming the colonizing effects of both money and
administrative power. An enriched civil society extends its
deliberative-communicative medium through the political public
sphere to provide normative moorings for the state's administrative
power. Civil society also extends its deliberative-communicative
medium to the economy as a normative source for developing
corporate responsibility, citizenship, and stakeholder ethos.
[7] In our everyday lifeworld, we revel in our cultural
heritages, coordinate our actions as groups according to mutually
reached and recognized norms, and develop individual and social
identities. These key features of the lifeworld - cultural
embodiment, social integration, and socialization - have both a
symbolic-metaphorical-linguistic and institutional dimensions.
Civil society as a public space corresponds to the institutional
dimension of our everyday lifeworld.5 An enriched, communicative
civil society imparts normative resources for a more emancipatory
and just deliberative democracy and for a more responsible
stakeholder economy, thereby weakening these great systems'
colonizing effects. Surely nothing could be more interesting to the
prophetic imagination? Further, an enriched, communicative civil
society contributes directly to the more private spaces of
lifeworld by providing a richer moral milieu than that possible
when each individual, family, or heritage tries to stitch together
its own moral code. Here, too, prophetic reason finds a vigorous
vocation.
The Communicative Ethos of Civil Society
[8] The descriptive account presented above assumes that civil
society is saturated with communicative practices. That is not the
case. Civil society as a sociological space is far more ambiguous.
We need a normative account of civil society and, again, the
communicative imagination will be the focus. Habermas's three
models of democracy suggest that three different modes of civil
society also exist. These modes impinge in different ways on civil
society's contributions to the economy and state and to the
lifeworld. Moreover, these forms have implications for the
Christian prophetic imagination itself. We now examine the
agonistic, liberal, and communicative modes of civil society.
Historically, the first two forms have dominated the American
imagination. Not surprisingly, these modes of civil society have
also contributed to its current impoverishment as well as to a more
heroic, oracular form of the Christian prophetic imagination.
[9] The dominant practices of the agonistic ethos revolve around
a "competitive struggle"- from the Greek agÇn - among rival
versions of personal and/or communal moral virtue. Within the
public space of civil society, each rival communal tradition
presents itself as a pure, self-sufficient, and cohesive totality
of virtue. A tradition's moral virtuosity vies for preeminence over
other communal traditions by displaying itself as publicly as
possible. These traditions strive to gain the acclaim of the
majority of citizens, who begin as passive onlookers, continue as
active imitators, and finish - at least an elite minority - as
admired moral masters. Commonly, despite the differences among
rival agonistic traditions, the internal social arrangements are
alike in being hierarchically stratified. Commonplace among
agonistic traditions is the root metaphor of the head mastering a
body. This is the deep-seated Western cephalous tradition, which
has various cross-cultural analogues.6 These agonistic practices
lead to the dominance of a single agenda of personal and communal
virtue along with the diminution, assimilation, or outright
elimination of rival communal traditions. Agonistic refers,
therefore, to the constellation of practices, forms, and attitudes
just described. Furthermore, the agonistic model of civil society
remains particularly susceptible to the technological temptations
of the now-ubiquitous sound bite. Conventional clichés,
simplistic stereotyping, and/or Manichaean scenarios exhaust the
moral possibilities. Apocalyptic rhetoric often abounds.
Communitarian heritages often promote an agonistic ethos, and so do
Christian movements with sectarian slants or catacomb
aspirations.7
Ironically, more conventional theocratic traditions, Christian and
otherwise, also promote the agonistic mode of civil society.
[10] One advantage of the agonistic model is that personal
virtues for practical, face-to-face living are cultivated through
the economy and politics, although systems are usually shielded
from serious moral-prophetic consideration. While agonistic
traditions often exude prophetic rhetoric across the political
spectrum, they sunder prophetic insight from rational criticism,
thereby retaining no aspiration to bring about serious social
change. Here we have all the problems that Tillich perceived and
that Habermas uncovered in his critique of negative dialectics. The
social costs remain steep. In the modern history of Western
societies, the agonistic ethos has corresponded and collaborated
with the republican model of democracy. In the longer stretch of
Western civilization, agonistic practices have collaborated with
monarchic and aristocratic political arrangements. Agnostic
practices have also saturated the more monarchic and aristocratic
forms of ecclesial imagination and life. There is little surprise,
then, that the domination of agonistic practices likewise
constricts the prophetic imagination to the heroic, oracular
personality or perhaps to the heroic, oracular tribe. But, must the
Christian prophetic imagination be so confined?
[11] The liberal ethos of civil society originated in order to
squelch the moral elitist and totalizing consequences of the
agonistic civil society. In the liberal ethos, moral discourse is
subject to the conversational constraint of neutrality whenever a
single moral tradition asserts that its moral conception of the
good life is superior to others. This constraint of neutrality
prohibits not only agonistic "trumping," but also "translating"
moral disagreements into a supposedly neutral framework as well as
"transcending" moral disagreements by imagining some hypothetical
circumstance. Rather, according to the conversational constraint of
neutrality, moral traditions must agree not to disagree in public
about the things that are most important and, instead, must confine
moral disagreements to private spheres. In this way liberalism
embeds "repressive tolerance" in the center of its
ethos.8 Not
only is disagreement privatized, but the very terrain of
controverted subject matters is privatized.9 Increasingly, liberal civil
society accedes morally relevant issues to the private-sector
economy, to lifestyle intimacy, or to a privatized conscience,
religious or otherwise. Along the way, the liberal model also
privatizes the congregation. By shuttling the potentially most
significant moral issues to private spheres, the liberal model
trumps other moral formulations. Paradoxically, the practices,
forms, and attitudes of the liberal ethos contribute to the
withering of civil society itself by reducing it to a buffer zone,
ameliorating the market economy's colonization of the lifeworld. By
suppressing the moral vigor of civil society, the liberal mode
unwittingly leaves the functional rationality of the state too
dominant and thereby too unaccountable to public communicative
reasoning. Similarly, the liberal practice of conversational
constraint consigns the prophetic imagination to private issues
and, indeed, aspires to neutralize the publicness of prophetic
reason.
[12] Emerging historically in the midst of the two dominant
models is the communicative mode of civil society. This innovative
model takes its practices, procedures, and attitudes from the
paradigm shift to communicative rationality and action. A
communicative civil society shares certain features with the
dominant models. Like the agonistic model and unlike the liberal
model of neutrality, it welcomes and, indeed, accentuates questions
of moral truth. Unlike the agonistic ethos, with its characteristic
practices of elitist moral display and purist moral trumping,
communicative civil society holds that claims to practical moral
truth must be redeemed critically through participatory practices.
Participatory procedures empower traditions and institutions to
have a say in the formulation, stipulation, and adoption of moral
norms, or, to use Habermas's terms, in justification and
application. Boldly stated, communicative civil society "comes into
existence whenever and wherever all affected by general social and
political norms of action engage in a practical discourse,
evaluating their validity."10
[13] By elevating participatory and communicative aspects, the
communicative model eschews the moral elitist, exhibitionist, and
totalizing tendencies at the heart of the agonistic model without,
however, succumbing to the liberal model of public moral
neutrality. A communicative civil society anticipates, even extols,
the capacity for creative moral possibilities and overlapping moral
insights. This anticipation depends on thick moral traditions
becoming socially embodied and mutually engaging according to
communicative procedures and by means of communicative practices. A
communicative civil society is not, however, naive. Communicative
procedures and practices themselves anticipate the manipulations
and systematic distortions that accompany the self-interested
monologue of any single moral tradition, including moral traditions
that include or highlight communicative procedures and
practices.11
Moreover, a communicative civil society recognizes the fallibilist
character of every communicative moral consensus. By so doing, a
communicative civil society always anticipates future argumentation
regarding any temporal moral consensus. As Christian eschatological
theology puts it, a "not yet" dimension remains in every "already"
achieved moral consensus. This is a crucial aspect of the
communicative ethos. Finally, the communicative model rescinds the
overly rigid boundaries between the public and private and,
instead, allows for overlapping terrains of public and private
life.12
[14] Along with identifying overlapping terrains, an emerging
communicative civil society supplies durable goods, one might say,
both to the economy and state and to the lifeworld. A prime moral
claim of the communicative imagination is that the search for the
common good ought to proceed as a common search for the
good.13 In this
way, common searching - communicatively imagined - becomes a
comprehensive moral good that serves the well-being of other moral
goods.14
Accentuating questions of moral truth has practical import. A
communicative civil society frequently shares argumentatively
tested moral wisdom with the everyday lifeworld. Further, a
communicative civil society often spots the colonizing consequences
of the instrumental and functional rationalities operating within
the economy's medium of money and the state's medium of
administrative power. In this way, a communicative civil society
ascertains that the great systems also contribute causally to the
heartlessness experienced within the everyday lifeworld. In all of
these ways, the communicative turn in critical social theory offers
insight for the prophetic imagination, thereby enlarging the scope
and enriching the field of prophetic reason.
[15] A communicative civil society also has moral import for the
great systems. It is essential for a viable deliberative democracy,
comparable in importance to the separation and interaction of
governmental powers and branches, and generates a reasoned form of
public opinion and will. A communicative civil society is also a
key companion of an economic system that attends to more than the
economic shareholders.15 Finally, a communicative
civil society is consequential for establishing, sustaining, and
improving the intersections between a materially productive market
economy and a deliberative democratic state. Along these
intersections among the weightier contributions of a communicative
civil society will be to focus questions regarding a just,
sustainable, and ecologically productive market economy. These
complex issues are crucial for overcoming the colonization of the
lifeworld.
[16] All these factors denote a future for the Christian
prophetic imagination beyond the heroic, oracular personality or
community. The emergence of a global civil society communicatively
rooted contains implications far beyond what we can explore in this
project. The possible mutual contributions between a global
communicative civil society and a communicative prophetic
imagination are staggering.
Communicatively Renewing the Prophetic Vocation of
Missional Congregations as Public Companions
[17] The return of North American congregations is
noteworthy.16
In an unprecedented way, specialists in many fields are taking up a
disciplined study of congregations. But congregations are returning
not merely as objects of study but, more importantly, as primal and
productive centers of theological imagination. A period of lament,
especially among mainline denominations, preceded this return. The
lament grew out of a widespread malaise associated with empty pews,
diminished coffers, loosening of denominational loyalties,
confusion of clerical identity, doctrinal uncertainty, and all-out
"worship wars," among other things. Precipitating this malaise was
a mainline "Christendom habit" that had seduced great numbers of
congregations into insular, sedentary, and ancillary modes of
existence. For more than a quarter-century, vast numbers of
congregations remained satisfied with the past glories and cultural
hegemony that they thought they possessed in the 1950s. Many
experts were composing dirges for these congregations, some with
glee, others with regret.17 The Christendom habit may
still persist, but as a shadow of its former self, reduced no doubt
to a therapeutics of personal refreshment and fulfillment.
[18] A smaller but growing number of people are taking steps
beyond Christendom's assumptions and habits.18 In seeking a new missional
ecclesiology in North America, they are confronting the poverty of
missional imagination and contesting its inevitability. The
Christian prophetic imagination must in a vital way suffuse this
innovative missional aspiration. Without the Christian prophetic
imagination, this critical retrieval of missional congregations and
ecclesial reflection risks replicating the old insular and
ancillary habits. I offer the communicative turn of critical social
theory as a formidable companion for instilling prophetic
imagination in missional congregations.
[19] How can we develop missional congregations as public
companions?19
Developing Christian congregations in this way does not envision a
return to Christendom, but an immersion in a pluralistic and
ambiguous era of many cultures, religions, and irreligions. We can
gain clarity about the metaphor "public companion" by situating it
within H. Richard Niebuhr's now-classic typology of "Christ and
culture," while also keeping in mind Avery Dulles's helpful "models
of the church."20 Niebuhr maps five types of
the relationship between Christ and culture, which can also be
viewed fruitfully as a typology of church and
culture.21 At
the polar extremes of the typology, he positions "Christ against
culture"- imagine that on the left of the chart - and "Christ of
culture"- imagine that on the right of the chart. The three
remaining types-"Christ and culture in paradox" (the Lutheran
type), "Christ transforming culture" (the Reformed type), and
"Christ above culture" (the Roman Catholic type)-are positioned
from left to right between the two poles. He describes these middle
types as the churches of the center, the type on the left pole
manifesting itself in the sectarian left wing of the Reformation,
for instance, and the type on the right pole in the
nineteenth-century liberal Protestant churches in Germany. The
metaphor "public companions," especially when embodying insights
and practices of the communicative imagination, resonates
dissonantly with either the "Christ against culture" type or the
"Christ of culture" type. Public companions in the communicative
mode provide more prophetically critical engagement with culture
than "Christ of culture" imagines and more proactive, prophetic
healing than "Christ against culture" imagines. More resonance
comes from the ecclesial heritages at the center of Niebuhr's
typology. I have found it especially fruitful to gather and revise
the fundamental claims made by the "Christ and culture in paradox"
heritage.22
[20] We can also gain more access to congregations as
communicatively prophetic public companions by situating our
metaphor within Dulles's "models of the church." He has five
models. The first three are more Roman Catholic-oriented, and the
latter two more Protestant-oriented. The Roman Catholic models are
church as "institution," as "mystical communion," and as
"sacrament." He offers these models as a way to chart the course
that Roman Catholic ecclesiology has traveled leading up to and
then flowing out of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). "Church
as institution" summarizes ecclesial doctrine from the late Middle
Ages and the Counter-Reformation, culminating in the First Vatican
Council in the late nineteenth century. "Church as mystical
communion" emerged in the first half of the twentieth century as a
way to move beyond "church as institution." This new model was more
communitarian and interpersonal than the first model and led to
many of the developments of Vatican II, with its focus on church as
the people of God and body of Christ. The third model, "church as
sacrament," also emerged during the twentieth century and became an
orienting doctrine of Vatican II. Because of the long heritage of
sacramental theology, this model provides, on the one hand, more
disciplined theological reflection to the more metaphorical and
biblical intuitions attached to "people of God" and "body of
Christ." On the other hand, "church as sacrament" also retrieves
certain aspects of "institution," combining them with the communal
features of "mystical communion."
[21] The fourth and fifth models are "church as herald," which
Lutherans brought to prominence, and "church as servant," favored
by Reformed churches. The "church as herald" orients the church
around gospel proclamation and toward enacting the gospel in and
for the world. The "church as servant" orients the church around
divine service in the world. The metaphor of public companionship
aspires to embody both models and to do so with the former
providing the abundance necessary for the latter. The metaphor also
aspires to overcome the privatization that has colonized both
models. Various sociohistorical forces have often combined to
reduce "church as herald" to an abstract kerygmatic address, either
objectifying individual hearers or stimulating individual decisions
of the will. These forces also reduce "church as servant" to the
habits of a service-sector economy, clinic, or family haven. These
reductions have suppressed numerous aspects of Christianity, surely
including the prophetic dimension of the Christian imagination.
Here I offer the public-companion metaphor only in reference to the
prophetic imagination within the servant model.23
[22] The Reformation developed the model of "servant" through
its critical theology of vocation.24 Against the individualistic
notion of vocation, the concept includes the ways that everyone,
knowingly or not, participates in God's public, ongoing work to
bring, nurture, and sustain temporal life. In trusting the gospel
of Jesus Christ, Christians acknowledge these places, purposes, and
institutions as God's creative work on behalf of their neighbors
and nations, and themselves as God's companions. Likewise,
congregations have a variety of vocations to bring God's creative
agency to bear on neighbors, neighborhoods, and nations. Building
moral milieus to make life in public communities possible commends
itself as one such calling. Civil society is the preferential,
though not only, location for this congregational vocation of
public companionship, and communicative moral practice is the best
ethos for prophetically nurturing the postmodern milieu toward
sustainable justice and freedom.25
[23] Congregations participate in the moral life of the
community in two ways simultaneously, one practice more internal
and the other more external. Internally, congregations have often
assisted families and individuals in moral formation, in particular
of the young, and this will continue as a prime vocation. As
congregations engage in moral formation, they can fall prey to
seeing themselves as private Christian enclaves, alienated,
isolated, and protected from the truth claims of other moral
traditions. In our ever more pluralistic public environment,
however, innumerable traditions ask congregations to offer
justification, in the sense of ethical grounding, for the moral
formation imparted. The communicative turn in critical social
theory is a welcome companion as congregations take up the work of
moral justification and application. Moreover, God regularly calls
Christian congregations, through the prophetic imagination of the
biblical heritage, to attend to the sufferings and oppressions of
neighborhoods and nations. The normative depiction of deliberative
democracy, obtained from critical social theory, helps
congregations retrieve and embody the prophetic imagination within
North American and global contexts. In all of these ways,
congregations exist as meeting places of private and public
life.26
[24] In this role, congregations respond with integrity to their
more external moral vocation as communicatively prophetic public
companions. Today an increasing number and variety of institutions
in civil society need public companions to join in encountering the
moral meanings latent in contemporary life. This is a risky
vocation, because Christian congregations do not have a monopoly on
moral wisdom. As communicatively prophetic public companions,
congregations become encumbered communities. They become encumbered
with the moral predicaments of other institutions and with the
colonizing influence of money and power. Christian congregations,
however, are no stranger to an encumbered life, to a life of the
cross. Herein lies the redemptive moment characterizing every
vocation, when encumbered companionship puts a congregation's
enclosed centrality to death.27
[25] In summary, certain marks characterize the vocation of the
communicatively prophetic, public companion. As prophetic public
companions, missional congregations acknowledge a conviction that
they participate in God's ongoing creative work. In a communicative
civil society, these congregations exhibit a compassionate
commitment to other institutions and their moral predicaments and
to contesting the systemic colonization of the lifeworld. In these
two senses, congregations as communicatively prophetic public
companions are thoroughly connected, both to God and to the social
and natural world. This vocational conviction and commitment yields
a critical and self-critical, and thus fully communicative,
practice of prophetic engagement. Finally, as communicatively
prophetic public companions, congregations participate with other
institutions of communicative civil society to create, strengthen,
and sustain the moral fabrics that fashion a life-giving and
life-accountable world.
Copyright © Fortress Press
Excerpt from Critical Social Theory is used by
permission.
ISBN 0800629167
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1 For the burgeoning literature on civil society, see John
Keene, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives
(London: Verso, 1988); Michael Walzer, "The Idea of Civil Society:
A Path to Social Reconstruction," Dissent 38 (spring 1991):
293-304; Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political
Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); Adam Seligman, The Idea
of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992); Robert Wuthnow,
Christianity and Civil Society: The Contemporary Debate (Valley
Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1996); Elisabeth Ozdalga
and Sune Persson, Civil Society, Democracy, and the Muslim World
(Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997); Tracy Kuperus, State,
Civil Society, and Apartheid in South Africa: An Examination of
Dutch Reformed Church-State Relations (New York: St.
Martin&=javascript:goNote(39s Press, 1999); John Ehrenberg,
Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York: New York
University Press, 1999); and Andrew Arato, Civil Society,
Constitution, and Legitimacy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield,
2000).
2 See Walzer, "Idea of Civil Society."
3 For one influential analysis of this situation, see
Robert Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for
Twenty-first Century Capitalism (New York: Knopf, 1991).
4 Christopher Lasch&=javascript:goNote(39s account of
the family, Haven in a Heartless World (New York: Basic Books,
1977), remains flawed precisely because he does not account for the
heartlessness of the family "haven" itself, leaving Lasch unable to
locate and access the moral resources that families themselves
desperately need. See Patrick Keifert, Welcoming the Stranger: A
Public Theology of Worship and Evangelism (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1992), for a trenchant critique of the ideology of intimacy
that infects the familially fashioned congregation and for a
promising proposal toward the renewal of public congregations.
5 For a more sustained theology of institutions from the
Lutheran heritage, see Gary M. Simpson, "Toward a Lutheran
&=javascript:goNote(39Delight in the Law of the Lord': Church
and State in the Context of Civil Society," in On Being Christians
and Citizens, ed. Robert Tuttle and John Stumme (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2001). Also see Wolfhart Pannenberg's theological
analysis of institutions in Anthropology in Theological Perspective
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), 397-416. Robert Bellah and
associates correctly portray the difficulty that many Americans
have in understanding how much of our everyday lives is lived in
and through institutions (see Robert Bellah et al., The Good
Society [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991], 3-18). Though much is
good in this book, the authors do not make civil society a theme.
This remains a major flaw in their conceptualization of "the public
church," where "God Goes to Washington" carries the weight of their
analysis.
6 I can only offer a snapshot of the cephalous metaphor
without its highly complex and integrated, nuanced and normed
narrative. According to the cephalous tradition most prominent in
North America, the body is not bad or evil per se as would be the
case in more dualistic, Manichaean versions. Rather, the body is
the seat of the passions, which, left to themselves, are out of
control, disordered, and un- or misdirected. In the cephalous
tradition&=javascript:goNote(39s normative account, the head
does not enslave the body. That is, the head does not master the
body in order to exploit the body for the head's own benefit. That
would be tyrannical. Such enslavement would violate the moral norms
of the cephalous tradition. Rather, the head cares for the body by
disciplining, ordering, and finally directing its passions for the
body's own good. In this sense, the head is often presented as
selfless, though not disembodied. A disembodied head would violate
the moral norm of the cephalous tradition and indeed would lead to
the death of the head and the body. The cephalous tradition often
exists in close proximity to different forms of love
patriarchalism, though it need not. I am developing a comprehensive
critique of the cephalous tradition in a collaborative publication
with New Testament scholar David Fredrickson.
7 The most influential contemporary version is that of
Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in
the Christian Colony (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989).
8 Herbert Marcuse&=javascript:goNote(39s notion of
"repressive tolerance" represents the classic discussion of
neutrality as a liberal constraint (see A Critique of Pure
Tolerance [Boston: Beacon Press, 1965], 81-123). See Ronald
Thiemann's insightful discussion of neutrality and toleration in
Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1996), 60-64, 72-80, 159-64. His
informative discussion of public reason (121-54) would benefit from
our investigations of communicative reason and civil society, and
his proposal for revised liberalism is worth considering (95-114).
Also see Oliver O'Donovan's criticism of liberalism in The Desire
of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). I do have
significant disagreements, especially with his immersion in the
Western communitarian-cephalous tradition, which lies just beneath
his text. The tradition provides significant ballast, especially in
his proposal's christological grounding. Still, O'Donovan marshals
a wealth of information; especially valuable for the communicative
imagination is his retrieval of the open-speech legacy of the
fourteenth- and fifteenth-century conciliarist movement (268-70).
For a fuller exposition of the conciliarist legacy from the
perspective of the history of political theory, see Quentin
Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2: The
Age of the Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1978), 113-23.
9 See Nancy Fraser&=javascript:goNote(39s fuller
diagnosis of this liberal dynamic in "Talking about Needs:
Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State
Societies," Ethics 99 (January 1989): 291-313; and in Unruly
Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
10 Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt,
the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas," in Habermas and
the Public Sphere, ed. C. Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1992), 87.
11 Communicative ethics, as Reinhold Niebuhr did,
exercises a double focus on human moral resources and
self-interested limitations (see especially Reinhold
Niebuhr&=javascript:goNote(39s Moral Man and Immoral Society
[New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932], xxiv). A fuller
Christian, theological account of the communicative moral
imagination, which is beyond the scope of this study, would closely
connect human moral resources to divine providence and would find a
home within Christian approaches to natural law. For a prolegomenon
along these lines, see my "Toward a Lutheran 'Delight in the Law of
the Lord.' " The subtitle of Niebuhr's book mentioned above is A
Study in Ethics and Politics, which manifests the weakness of his
account. He fails to focus explicitly on civil society as well as
on the communicative access to that space.
12 See note 15 above.
13 Here I adapt Dennis McCann&=javascript:goNote(39s
poignant phrase from "The Good to Be Pursued in Common," paper
presented at "Catholic Social Teaching and the Common Good,"
University of Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Religious Values in
Business, April 14-16, 1986.
14 For an engaging analysis of democracy and comprehensive
goods that critically engages the communicative imagination, see
Franklin Gamwell, Democracy on Purpose: Justice and the Reality of
God (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000).
15 See, for instance, John W. Dienhart, ed., Business,
Institutions, and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),
227-70.
16 I borrow the phrase "return of the congregation" and
important insights from my colleague Patrick Keifert, "The Return
of the Congregation: Missional Warrants," Word & World 20 (fall
2000): 368-78.
17 For an insightful account of the history of
congregational studies during the twentieth century, see James Wind
and James Lewis, "Introduction: Introducing a Conversation," in
American Congregations, vol. 2: New Perspectives in the Study of
Congregations, ed. J. Wind and J. Lewis (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994), 1-20.
18 Among this growing number are George Hunsberger and
Craig Van Gelder, eds., The Church between Gospel and Culture: The
Emerging Mission in North America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996);
Nancy Ammerman et al., Congregations and Community (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1997); Darrell Guder, ed., The
Missional Church: A Vision for the Sending of the Church in North
America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998); and Patrick Keifert and
Patricia Taylor Ellison, Testing the Spirit: Congregational Studies
as Interdisciplinary Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
forthcoming). Core theological practices and critical reflection on
those practices constitute the thick milieu within which prophetic
reasoning is embedded. I cannot in this study examine those
constitutive factors of the Christian congregation. Two others who
have contributed to this work from the perspective of critical
social theory and Roman Catholic christology and ecclesiology are
Edmund Arens, Christopraxis: A Theology of Action, trans. J.
Hoffmeyer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), and Paul Lakeland,
Theology and Critical Theory: The Discourse of the Church
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990). In a forthcoming work with New
Testament interpreter David Fredrickson, I employ the communicative
imagination to retrieve repressed traditions within christology,
ecclesiology, and Christian confessing that constitute Christian
missional congregations.
19 I have proposed aspects of this inquiry in three
earlier programmatic essays. See Gary M. Simpson, "God, Civil
Society, and Congregations as Public Companions," in Keifert and
Ellison, Testing the Spirit; "Toward a Lutheran
&=javascript:goNote(39Delight in the Law of the Lord' "; and
"No Trinity, No Mission: The Apostolic Difference of Revisioning
the Trinity," Word & World 18 (summer 1998): 264-71.
20 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York:
Harper & Row, 1951). I neither rehearse the well-known
limitations and problems that accompany typologies of this sort nor
offer my own critical reflections on
Niebuhr&=javascript:goNote(39s explication, which includes the
nontrinitarian way he frames the inquiry. The benefit of well-known
typologies is the clarity they provide and the points of reference
they establish in a pluralistic environment. See Avery Dulles's
reflections on the limits and usefulness of typologies and models
in Models of the Church, expanded ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1987),
9-33. Niebuhr himself was aware of these issues (Christ and
Culture, 43-44).
21 I note one significant caveat as I employ the
Christ-and-culture typology. I use the term culture in this
paragraph in the broad sense that Niebuhr himself used it, that is,
incorporating a panorama of human reality, including the great
institutions and systems that comprise civilizations. Niebuhr notes
that his use of the term parallels how New Testament writers often
use "the world" (see especially Christ and Culture, 29-32). For an
insightful recent consideration of theology and culture, see
Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997).
22 Lutheran theological ethicist Robert Benne has employed
Niebuhr&=javascript:goNote(39s notion in Paradoxical Vision: A
Public Theology for the Twenty-first Century (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1995). I differ with Benne's helpful exposition because he
thinks of "church" in a twentieth-century manner-that is, too
denominationally-and does not account for civil society as a
pivotal space of public communicative reason and action. I also
differ with his ideological choice of targets for shrill
rhetoric.
23 Lutherans developed the servant dimensions of church
through their critical theology of vocation. Sadly, the theology
and practice of vocation among Lutherans too often became
individual and privatized. For an innovative contribution to
evangelization, which in Dulles&=javascript:goNote(39s typology
would appear within the "herald" model, see Keifert, Welcoming the
Stranger. The two Reformation models need not be isolated, and
ought not be isolated, from facets that the Roman Catholic models
attempt to exalt. Reformation theology has enduring contributions
to make, especially as it addresses traditionally Roman Catholic
formulations out of its own confessional claims regarding the
church. Reformation contributions have yet to be made, for
instance, in communion ecclesiology. For a provocative contribution
from a Baptist perspective, see Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness:
The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1998).
24 For a Lutheran contribution to vocation within the
context of political authority, see my "Toward a Lutheran
&=javascript:goNote(39Delight in the Law of the Lord.' "
Noteworthy is how the first two generations of Lutherans developed
prophetic reasoning by means of their resistance theory. For the
best brief summation of the Reformation doctrine of vocation, see
Marc Kolden, "Creation and Redemption; Ministry and Vocation,"
Currents in Theology and Mission 14 (February 1987): 31-37.
25 Behind my proposal for a communicative civil society
breathes a doctrine of God and creation, of humans in the image of
God, and of the Reformation understanding of sin, evil, and the
first use of the law. For preliminary reflections on these issues,
see Simpson, "God, Civil Society, and Congregations as Public
Companions," and idem, "Toward a Lutheran
&=javascript:goNote(39Delight in the Law of the Lord.' " For a
handbook on moral deliberation appropriate for public
congregational life, see P. Keifert, P. Taylor Ellison, and R.
Duty, eds., Growing Healthier Congregations or How to Talk Together
When Nobody's Listening (St. Paul, Minn.: Church Innovations,
1999). For a helpful analysis of congregations as communities of
moral deliberation in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America,
see Per Anderson, "Deliberation, Holism, and Responsibility: Moral
Life in the ELCA," address at the annual meeting of the Society of
Christian Ethics, Chicago, January 2001.
26 See Martin E. Marty, "Public and Private: Congregation
as Meeting Place," in Wind and Lewis, American Congregations,
2:133-66.
27 For my own exploration of the theology of the cross and
the communicative imagination, see Gary M. Simpson, "Theologia
Crucis and the Forensically Fraught World: Engaging Helmut Peukert
and Jürgen Habermas," in Habermas, Modernity, and Public
Theology, ed. D. Browning and F. Fiorenza (New York: Crossroad,
1992), 173-205.