[1] The second section of In Search of the Common Good
is entitled "Classical Voices." As the title of this section
suggests, the essays are devoted to examining the concept of the
common good as it has been understood in the writings of Thomas
Aquinas, the body of teachings of the Catholic Church referred to
as "Catholic Social Teaching" (CST), and the place of the common
good within public discourse.
[2] The introduction and the first essay of "Classical Voices"
are authored by noted ethicist and Notre Dame professor Jean
Porter. Porter's essay "The Common God in Thomas Aquinas" seeks to
understand, "a distinctively premodern approach to social ethics"
(96), the influence that Aquinas's understanding of the common good
has had in the development of CST, and the theological aspects of
Aquinas's articulation of the common good.
[3] Porter's treatment of the common good in Aquinas draws
primarily on his most mature theological work, the Summa
theologiae (ST). Porter identifies two primary areas
of thought in which Aquinas locates the common good. Firstly,
Aquinas treats the common good in conjunction with political
authority and, secondly, in conjunction with his understanding of
virtue. Porter begins her discussion of Aquinas's treatment of the
common good in relation to political authority by noting that
Aquinas understands the human condition in terms of both its pre-
and post-lapse states. As a result, there are elements of human
existence that are not wholly derived from the state of sin. Thus,
according to Aquinas, political authority now enjoys the challenge
of governing subjects who, because of sin, do not always will what
is good for themselves or the community. The fact that the
governing authority governs on behalf of the common good is not
something that is established by sin, but by human nature as such,
which would be served by the common good whether in a fallen state
or not. Had man not sinned, the common good would still be a
component of man's social existence. Hence, Aquinas draws a
distinction between the private or individual good and the common
good, associating the latter with the responsibilities and
authority of the governing body whose task it is to protect it.
Porter also points out three essential elements in Aquinas's
understanding of the relationship between the common good and the
political authority to make laws:
The first is that positive law takes its point, and therefore
its legitimacy, from its orientation to the common good . .
.Second, positive law can only be promulgated by someone who has
legitimate law-making authority-and this authority stems from the
legislator's responsibility to act for the common good. Finally,
not everything can be justified through an appeal to the common
good. A decree that places inequitable burdens on different persons
is unjust and therefore not a valid law, even if it is genuinely
oriented toward the common good. (109)
[4] Porter explains that for Aquinas, public authorities, for
the sake of upholding the common good, are able to perform certain
actions that private citizens are not. The public authority can,
for example, "kill those who are guilty of a capital offense . .
.the soldier may kill enemy soldiers because he is acting on the
authority of the ruler . . .[and]seize property from infidels, in
pursuit of a just war, or for the sake of the common good."
(110)
[5] Besides its relation to the exercise of legitimate
authority, Porter demonstrates that Aquinas treats the common good
in conjunction with the life of virtue, especially the virtue of
justice. Without ignoring the important nuances between the
individual good and the common good, Porter notes that in Aquinas's
system of virtue, " . . . just persons are the principal part of
society . . ." by which he means " . . .that the well-being of
upright citizens is the raison d'être of a community, in such
a way that a community that attacks its own citizens has undermined
the common good."(114) As a result, the common good of the
community "is constituted, in part, by the boundaries of justice.
These boundaries include fundamental norms of respect for
individual well-being."(114)
[6] Porter's essay, too briefly recounted here, offers the
reader a helpful introduction to the common good in Aquinas, as
well as the wider theological nuances of his political theory and
virtue based ethics.
[7] The second essay in "Classical Voices" is "The Common Good
in Catholic Social Teaching: A Case Study in Modernization" by
Denis McCann. This essay offers a broad depiction of the common
good in the patrimony of social documents and teachings promulgated
by the Catholic Church over the last 100 years. McCann's central
hermeneutic for discerning the Catholic Church's understanding of
the common good is "modernization." As a result, he attempts to
explain the nature of the common good, as taught by the hierarchy
of the Roman Catholic Church, in terms of what he perceives to be
phases of modernization and resistance to modernization. McCann
uses this hermeneutic of modernization to divide his essay into
four chronological stages: "(1) Resistance (1830-1907), (2)
Critical Engagement (1891-1958), (3) Accommodation (1958-78), and
then (4) Consolidation in the[n] current pope John Paul II, which
combines elements of all three (1978-)."(126)
[8] McCann introduces the first phase of modernization, the
"Resistance," by referring to a document of Pius IX, which does not
mention the common good. However, relative to modernization, McCann
explains that this document displays, "the overall impression . . .
of impotent rage against impending doom."(129) When treating the
meaning of the common good according to Pius IX's successor, Leo
XIII, who authored Rerum novarum in 1891, a seminal
document in the history of CST, McCann notes that rather than being
explicitly defined, "the common good [in Rerum novarum]
thus presupposes an unequal or-as Aristotle would have it-a
proportionate distribution of political, economic, and social
goods." (132) Oddly, McCann makes scant reference to the industrial
revolution and its challenges to human dignity and the dignity of
labor which were clearly linked to Leo's promulgation of Rerum
novarum.
[9] The second phase, "Critical Engagement," is best represented
by Pius XI's Quadragesimo anno (1931), written on the
fortieth anniversary of Rerum novarum. McCann treats this
document as an "illuminating representative of CST's development
within the Catholic Church's ongoing struggle with
modernization."(132) McCann rightly points out that in the face of
the development of fascism and laissez-faire economics, Pius XI
highlights the important obligation that the state has in defending
and promoting the common good, particularly by recognizing the
natural right of its citizens to private property.
[10] The third phase, "Accommodation," includes the period of
the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). In the sixteen documents
issued by the Council, Gaudium et spes (The Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World) offers the most
formal definition of common good that can be found in CST. "The
common good," explains Gaudium et spes, "embraces the sum
of those conditions of social life whereby men, families and
associations more adequately and readily may attain their own
perfection." (par. 74) McCann sees in this definition "a crucial
accommodation" (138) to modernization because here "the common good
is understood teleologically."(ibid.) Such an assertion is
difficult to understand because the notion of good (bonum)
has consistently been seen in the Christian tradition to be
teleological. Thus, why McCann deems the teleological thrust of
Gaudium et spes' definition to be an accommodation rather
than a continuation is not obvious.
[11] The final phase, "Consolidation," treats the pontificate of
John Paul II. McCann identifies a certain innovation in John Paul
II's exposition of the common good; namely, the placing of the
common good in its properly theological horizon, which thus reveals
the eschatological character of the common good. One wonders how
McCann can deem this fact to be an "innovation" when CST is
understood by the Church to be a part of her moral theology? Also,
McCann wholly omits John Paul II's promulgation of the
Catechism of the Catholic Church, which contains a very
helpful section on CST and an entire sub-section on the common
good.
[12] The reader of McCann's chapter will learn something about
the common good in the modern documents of the Magisterium of the
Catholic Church. But, McCann's hermeneutic of modernization
seriously inhibits his ability to recount for the reader the
substance of what he is trying to explain. Also, now that the
Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace has issued the English
edition of its Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the
Church (Libreria Editrice Vaticana: 2005),
McCann's essay finds itself dated-and challenged.
[13] The final essay of the section on "Classical Voices" is
"Public Discourse and Common Good" by Robin Lovin. Lovin's essay
provides an interesting comparison between Thomas Aquinas,
Whig-Thomist John Courtney Murray, and noted political philosopher
John Rawls. The discussion focuses on the place that common good
discourse-as understood by these diverse thinkers-has within the
tradition of Western democratic liberalism. "My proposal is,"
explains Lovin, "that liberal theory and the common good raise
complementary concerns about our political life, and both have a
place in an account of the variety of forms that public discourse
takes."(148) The problem is, of course, that the public discussion,
let alone public pursuit of the common good, "requires a degree of
agreement that is rare in modern pluralistic societies."(148) This
problem is further accentuated by the fact that modern liberalism
grew out of a conscious desire to provide an alternative to the
forced unanimity that the Colonists of the New World sought to
escape. As a result, Lovin notes that modern democracies tend to
focus on "minimal agreement and shared procedures, rather than
common goals."(148)
[14] In contrast to modernity's quest to minimize or avoid
public discussion of the common good, Thomas Aquinas held that the
very purpose of civil laws, when enacted by those who possess due
authority, is to safeguard and promote the common good. This
position marks a strong contrast between the way that a classical
Christian view, as represented by Aquinas, and a contemporary
outlook differ in how they understand law and governmental
authority. Whereas Aquinas sees law and authority as a divinely
ordained means of protecting the common good, modern liberalism's
primary focus is on the rights of individuals. Rawl's contribution
to this discussion is that he recognizes the irreducible pluralism
of democratic society and thus without jettisoning the notion of
the common good and its place within public discussion, he
jettisons the idea that it be based on any set of shared societal
goals. Rather than identify the common good with shared goals,
which would, in the end, suffocate pluralism, Rawls advocates the
concept of "public reason." Lovin explains that, "'public reasons'
for Rawls are in the first instance, simply those reasons that give
persons in a society reasons to think that the laws under which
they live are legitimate."(153) This, according to Lovin,
establishes a certain loose continuity between Rawls and Aquinas.
"[W]hat Rawls and Aquinas have in common," he explains, "is that
each thinks it is important that people have reasons to obey the
law, and indeed, having those reasons is essential for the law to
be legitimate."(153) What John Courtney Murray, who was a noted
Catholic theologian at the Second Vatican Council, adds to this
issue is his understanding of "civil argument." Civil argument is
"an ongoing process that defines the political community."(156) The
point of such discourse is not to bring a cessation to public
discussion about the common good, nor to advance one notion at the
expense of all others, but to foster a continued public discussion
"by which we arrive at agreement about what the constitution means
for the moment, in our present situation." (156)
[15] Lovin's presentation of these various positions on the
common good and its place in public discourse offers a helpful and
concise locus for anyone seeking to learn more about the parameters
of the discussion and the major thinkers who have contributed to
it. Unfortunately, Lovin fails to mention the deep criticisms that
Murray's thought has received. David Louis Schindler, for one, in
his Heart of the World, Center of the Church
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), has raised trenchant questions
regarding Murray's thought, questions which impinge on the veracity
of Lovin's assessment. Also, one could certainly argue that Lovin
has imposed the common good onto what is actually a debate about
the true meaning of freedom. Lovin seems to think that the problems
raised by the common good stem from the pluralism of democracy,
when in fact, one could ask whether or not this is the consequence
of the exultation of freedom as the ultimate arbiter of morality,
public or otherwise. The place of individual liberty in current
public debates about abortion, euthanasia, same sex unions, inter
alia, serves as case in point. Finding a place for the common good
in public discourse will offer little help if citizens in western
societies accept a notion of open-ended liberty.
[16] The second section of In Search of the Common
Good, "Classical Voices," gives the reader some exposure to
the social vision of the Catholic Church and tradition,
particularly in its Thomist strain. But, with the exception of
Porter's essay on Aquinas, the title "Classical Voices" is a bit
misleading. There is no substantial treatment of Augustine,
Bonaventure, or any other major "classical voice" of the Christian
tradition. The three essays of this section do not work well
together, thus leaving the reader who is searching for the common
good amidst the classical voices with a fair number of
unanswered-perhaps even unasked-questions.
© May
2006
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 6, Issue 5