[1] Despite-or perhaps because of-the great volume of books
published annually on Darwinian evolution and intelligent design,
few new contributions are worth the time of those familiar with the
major works of Dawkins and Gould, Johnson and Dembski. (Recent
exceptions to this rule would include Michael Behe's penetrating
The Edge of Evolution and David Berlinski's droll yet lucid The
Devil's Delusion.) Hence I found myself pleasantly surprised by the
present volume, Intelligent Design: William A. Dembski &
Michael Ruse in Dialogue, edited by Robert B. Stewart, professor of
philosophy and theology at New Orleans Baptist Theological
Seminary.
[2] Professor Stewart organizes the Greer-Heard
Point-Counterpoint Forum in Faith and Culture, which brings
together an evangelical and non-evangelical scholar to discuss a
matter of religious or cultural import. The 2006 forum on
intelligent design was being prepared when on August 29, 2005
Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. Most of the seminary was
suddenly underwater, and Stewart's own home was flooded. His family
was safe but lost nearly ninety percent of their belongings.
Nevertheless, Stewart persevered and found a church willing to host
the group of scholars, chief among them Christian mathematician and
philosopher William Dembski and atheist philosopher of science
Michael Ruse.
[3] In the first section of the book, Dembski and Ruse present
papers and then converse informally about intelligent design, the
idea that certain features of the universe and of living things are
best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process
such as natural selection. The conversation is interesting, but not
radically novel.
[4] The remainder of the book, however, contains essays by some
of the finest thinkers on intelligent design and evolution today.
Chief among them are John Lennox of Oxford University, William Lane
Craig and J.P. Moreland of the Talbot School of Theology, Francis
Beckwith of Baylor University, and Nancey Murphy of Fuller
Theological Seminary. Other more familiar writers also appear:
Alister McGrath, Sir John Polkinghorne, and Wolfhart
Pannenberg.
[5] For the sake of space, let us survey just one of the essays,
that of Alister McGrath. Here we see one way not to argue against
the "new atheists." I suspect that many Christian readers will have
a natural sympathy for McGrath in his essay "Dawkins, God, and the
Scientific Enterprise: Reflections of the Appeal to Darwinism in
Fundamentalist Atheism." After all, he is thoughtful and balanced
where his infamous interlocutor (Dawkins) is prone to triumphalism
and rhetorical excess.
[6] Even so, McGrath constructs a rather tenuous argument (if
you'll allow me to simplify): Since religion and metaphysics are
important realities and yet, contra Dawkins, are not "scientific,"
religion and science must not overlap much (McGrath subscribes to a
variation of Stephen Jay Gould's NOMA). Further, since Darwinism is
true, and Christianity is also, Darwinian attempts to reduce all
reality to the effects of the mutation-selection mechanism are
wrong. Darwinism should stay in its proper place and discuss only
biological development. Properly construed, science has little to
do with religion and should stay out of the matter. Therefore,
Dawkins and his ilk should not use Darwinism to promote
atheism.
[7] Now, I have no wish to defend Dawkins. But this kind of
argument, while compelling at first sight, cannot stand.
[8] First, McGrath talks right past Dawkins. When Dawkins says
the question of God is "scientific," he is a lay-philosopher
speaking to a lay audience. He does not mean that scientists in
white lab coats can do tidy experiments on God to settle the
question, as McGrath and others seem to think. Rather, he means
that the question of God's existence is largely a question of
empirical evidence. As Dawkins once put it, "A universe with a God
would look quite different from a universe without one. A physics,
a biology where there is a God is bound to look different."
[9] Yes, Dawkins takes this too far at times, nearly claiming
that everything important is in the domain of science. (How
convenient for the zoologist!) But his basic point-that the
question of God is an evidential one (including evidence of the
natural world) as opposed to an absurd leap of faith-is one many
Christian philosophers and scientists (including McGrath)
implicitly agree with when they argue for the fine-tuning of the
laws of physics or appeal to the Kalâm cosmological argument.
Moreover, of course, the Christian scriptures concord with such a
view, stating explicitly that we can and should know God-if only in
rough outline-through the natural world.
[10] But aren't atheist fundamentalists still wrong to reduce
all of life to a product of natural selection and random genetic
mutations? Yes, and this is what is alluring about McGrath's
position. He intuitively grasps, as sensible people do, that life
as we know it cannot be reduced to the selection-mutation
mechanism. However, this is not because Darwinism and reductionism
can be separated, as McGrath believes. Rather, it is because
Darwinism, which is inherently reductionistic, is false.
[11] As Daniel Dennett famously wrote, Darwinism is a universal
acid. And once it is accepted, traditional religion, morality, and
other notions corrode. But why must this be so? Why can't McGrath
be correct in asserting that a rational person can believe that 1)
all of life developed by a Darwinian process, and yet 2) this fact
has no drastic implications for religion, morality, or
epistemology?
[12] The trouble with this position begins early on. It is not
that one cannot logically believe in Darwinism and the Christian
God at the same time. William Lane Craig shows in his fantastic, if
technical, essay how belief in Darwinism does not necessarily
commit one to naturalism. However, once Darwinism is accepted, the
very nature of what it means to believe is radically changed.
Because we are biological creatures, accepting the proposition that
all of life's diversity came about through the interaction of
natural selection and random mutation means that our brains were
built by this very process.
[13] What then are we to make of traditional morality, given a
Darwinian world? Well, as Darwin noted in The Descent of Man, if we
had evolved with the selection pressures of the particular
environment faced by bees, we would have bee morality. In other
words, what humans call "good" is not based upon an objective,
unchanging truth of reality. If we had faced different situations
in our evolutionary history, perhaps we would view infanticide as
ethical, Darwin implies. Natural law and virtue ethics, then, are
out the window: the proper function of human beings cannot be
discerned for the very good reason that there is no proper function
of humans, only myriad different situations to which we must adapt
or face extinction.
[14] What about religion? Is it safe, as McGrath seems to think,
from Darwinian explanations? Absolutely not. There are all sorts of
brain mechanisms involved in religious belief. If the contingent,
Darwinian process made our brains, it makes perfect sense to look
for contingent explanations to explain away these particular
beliefs. They must have had survival value at some point in the
past; or, alternatively, as Dawkins and his wing of the atheist
camp prefer, religion does not have direct survival value but is a
by-product of something else that does have survival value.
[15] Note too, that the Darwinian explanation really does
explain away rather than explain religious belief. It is not that
the Darwinian explanation for X and the content of X cannot both be
true, but rather that, once one learns that particular religious
belief X came about because we used to run from lions on the
savannah, X loses its justification. I did not come to believe X by
any sort of rational or designed process; rather, I believe X
because my evolutionary history gave me a tendency to believe X.
Luckily for us, Darwinian explanations of religious belief are
extremely thin.
[16] The deepest problem however, to which we have already
alluded, is epistemological-a fact that neither Dawkins nor McGrath
ever address. As philosopher Alvin Plantinga has shown, and as
Darwin himself feared, given an unguided process of naturalistic
evolution, it is highly improbable that our minds give us a
reliable view of reality. As Darwin memorably phrased the problem:
the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's
mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals,
are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the
convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in
such a mind?
[17] If we accept unguided Darwinian evolution, we have lost all
justification for believing in Darwinian evolution; if it is true,
we cannot know it to be true. In a Darwinian scenario, our minds
were not made to know truth but to survive, and these are two very
different things indeed. There are all sorts of false beliefs which
would aid survival.
[18] What McGrath misses is that Darwinian evolution tells a
story of how our brains developed and therefore has something to
say about the contents of our minds. Thus, we cannot accept the
Darwinian story of development and then cry foul when atheist
Darwinists say that the contents of our brains came about by
Darwinian selection and mutation. At that point, we have painted
ourselves into a corner. We have accepted certain premises; and it
is intellectually dishonest not accept their unsavory
conclusions.
[19] If McGrath and others like Francis Collins wish to maintain
this position, they owe the theistic community a positive account
of how homo sapiens can develop via mutation and selection and yet
still hold accurate beliefs about the world-especially our most
cherished moral and religious beliefs. They must explain to us how
all of our other features can be explained by Darwin's mechanism
and yet somehow our beliefs about God and ethics remain
unaffected.
[20] Martinez Hewlett of the University of Arizona makes the
same mistake in his essay, "The Evolution Wars." He wants to accept
"the fruitful science of evolution without the ideological shrink
wrapping." That is he wants Darwinian empirical observations
without Darwinian reductionist philosophy. The problem, as we have
seen, is that some scientific observations are philosophically
loaded. Empirical science often overlaps with the realms of
religion, philosophy, and meaning.
[21] This is obvious in the rest of life, but as an intellectual
culture we are stuck with this positivistic separation. For
instance, Christian tradition has long rejected the idea that
sexual activity can be disconnected from moral and spiritual
reality. But why? It is just a physical act, right? Well, it is a
physical act, but not merely a physical one. Some physical states
of affairs imply non-physical realities: the sexual act implies
trust, love, and commitment. Christian sexual ethics holds to a
certain anthropology, a view of what the human person is; and it is
this deep anthropology that a cavalier attitude toward sex
undermines. Certain (physical) acts imply that the human person is
(metaphysically) less than what he is.
[22] Turning back to our current discussion, we see then that
the conflict is not so much between God and Darwin as it is between
reductionism and anti-reductionism. Those of us who want to
maintain that beliefs about God and morality are more than the
result of the historically contingent survival needs in our
evolutionary past cannot give in to a theory which claims that all
our beliefs are the result of this survival mechanism. And make no
mistake: this is exactly what Darwinism claims. Of course
Christians should feel free to adapt the findings of modern biology
as they see fit to compose a form of guided or pre-programmed
theistic evolution, but we must then remember (especially in our
public rhetoric) that we are no longer speaking of Darwinism.
[23] While Intelligent Design contains many worthwhile essays,
it has two drawbacks for potential readers. First, if one is
seeking a volume with the best arguments for and against
intelligent design, this is not it. This is not because this group
of ID advocates is incompetent; rather it is because of the nature
of the essays. For instance, while Wesley Elsberry and Nicholas
Matzke of the National Center for Science Education (a Darwin-only
education lobbying group) argue directly against ID, no ID
proponents argue the positive case for ID. Rather, ID proponents'
essays take one aspect of ID and apply it to a narrower, scholarly
reflection. For instance, philosopher of mind J.P. Moreland does
not defend ID in biology. Instead, he argues that an intelligent
design paradigm of psychology (specifically a Christian version of
intelligent design psychology) compares favorably to the
psychological paradigm of evolutionary naturalism.
[24] So, the essays do not line up in a point-counterpoint
fashion. In many ways this is commendable: Intelligent Design does
not waste time treading over well-worn ground-with the exception of
the Elsberry-Matzke attack where we hear recycled clichés to
the effect of "ID is creationism." Readers seeking a balanced,
scholarly treatment of the scientific disputes should consult
Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, edited by Dembski and Ruse
(Cambridge, 2004).
[25] Second, and finally, the book does not fit neatly into
common categories. Some essays are scholarly, and others are more
popular; so it is difficult to recommend to either camp. Still,
this volume is exceptional in that genuinely new ground is staked
out. In one notable example theologian Ken Keathley unearths a
fascinating historical parallel between current tensions among
Young Earth Creationists and ID proponents by contrasting their
disagreement to the early church's response to the flat or round
Earth controversy involving early Christian thinkers Cosmas and
Philoponus. Rather than sneeringly comparing one side to the "flat
Earthers," Keathley draws genuine lessons of caution for those
entering the ID debate. [26] For bringing together original
contributions such as this, readers will be grateful to Robert
Stewart for his perseverance, even in the face of hardship and
tragedy.
© October 2008
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 8, Issue 10