In recent months, the President and other members of his
administration have openly declared their desire and intent to
achieve "regime change" in Iraq. And since previous methods of
ousting Saddam Hussein-economic sanctions and coup d'etat-have
obviously failed, the President is seriously considering even more
dramatic options, including full-scale military invasion (Shanker).
How should we evaluate that proposal?
 According to the just-war tradition, which has been strongly
influenced by Christian ethicists, there are a number of important
questions that we must address before waging war. Some people might
claim that we've been in an unbroken state of war with Iraq ever
since its invasion of Kuwait, given Iraq's failure to abide by key
elements of the 1991 armistice and its defiance of UN resolutions.
But a major escalation of U.S. air attacks or the insertion of U.S.
ground troops into Iraqi territory cannot simply be assumed to be a
logical extension of existing mandates (Will). They require
separate evaluation and justification.
Does the President have legitimate authority to invade
Iraq?  Constitutionally the President is
commander-in-chief of U.S. armed forces, but Congress has the sole
authority to declare war. In the wake of the 9-11 terrorist
attacks, Congress granted the President extensive authority to
punish their sponsors and prevent further attacks. This is one
reason why the Bush Administration has tried to tie the 9-11
protagonists to Iraqi intelligence agents: if Saddam Hussein could
be shown to have supported the 9-11 plot, then Bush might justify
invading Iraq under his existing congressional anti-terror mandate.
But there's not enough evidence to indicate Iraqi sponsorship.
 Presidents have some constitutional leeway in using limited
military force when there isn't time to obtain congressional
consent. But Iraq doesn't seem to pose an imminent threat to the
U.S. (or any other country, for that matter), so the President
can't credibly claim that there isn't enough time for him to
consult legislators before invading (Rakove). Many members of
Congress have in fact demanded that the President obtain their
explicit consent for an invasion of Iraq (Mufton). Even staunch
Republican Congressman Dick Armey has warned against an
"unprovoked" U.S. attack that would "violate international law" and
undermine support for broader U.S. goals (Schmitt).
 But if Congress were to bless a Bush invasion, there are
wider concerns about its legitimacy in the minds of Iraq's
neighbors and U.S. allies. Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran
have vehemently opposed a U.S. invasion, apparently fearing the
chaos that might ensue from a power vacuum in Baghdad (Simpson;
Telhami; Marr). Invasion is not much more popular in Europe, either
(Tyler). The U.S. garnered strong international support for its
military responses to Iraq in 1990-1991 and against Al Qaeda and
the Taliban in Afghanistan post-9-11. But it risks widespread
international condemnation now if it invades Iraq unilaterally.
Is there a sufficiently weighty moral reason ("just
cause") to invade?  The primary concern about Iraq
today is its possession, development, use and proliferation of
"weapons of mass destruction" (WMD). Saddam Hussein has used
chemical weapons against Iranian troops and his own Kurdish
population, and has threatened to use them against Israel. He also
possesses biological weapons, and is actively seeking to develop
nuclear weapons. He was obligated under the 1991 agreement ending
the Gulf War to permit UN inspections and to dismantle all WMD. But
he defied the inspectors for years, and since 1998 has refused to
allow them to enter the country. High-level Iraqi defectors
indicate that Saddam still seeks to possess WMD (Hamza; Cordesman;
 Another major worry is Iraq's sponsorship and training of
terrorists. Of course, other countries like Syria and Iran do that
as well, yet haven't been the object of U.S. invasion threats. But
the prospect of Saddam Hussein arming terrorists with WMD puts him
in another league entirely (Hamza). He must be stopped.
Given the destruction that an invasion could produce,
are its means morally proportionate to its objectives? Or is there
an option better than war?  Since the Gulf War, the
U.S. has substantially improved the accuracy of its "smart" weapons
as well as the coordination of those weapons with spotters on the
ground. In theory this ought to reduce significantly the number of
innocent Iraqi civilians who would be killed or maimed in a U.S.
invasion, though it's also contingent on the quality of
intelligence our troops obtain about what is and is not a military
 Iraq's military forces, though sizeable, are considerably
diminished and fragmented from their peak strength in 1980-1990.
Western military experts have little doubt that Iraq would lose in
a major military confrontation with the U.S. today (Cordesman).
However, Saddam Hussein apparently learned from the Gulf War not to
expose his troops and equipment to destruction in the open desert,
and has announced plans to concentrate his defenses on Iraq's major
cities. He anticipates that urban warfare will allow him to inflict
great losses among U.S. troops, as well as generate outrage against
the U.S. from the deaths of Iraqi civilians (Miller &
 The human cost of a battle for Baghdad could well be
extensive, and would inflame millions of Arabs and Muslims if film
of Iraqi civilian casualties were to air on satellite TV (as it
surely would). This would also throw an enormous wrench into the
beleaguered effort to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine,
and possibly induce further terrorist attacks against the U.S. by
Muslim fundamentalists (Halperin).
 Moreover, although Saddam Hussein has not actively sought
martyrdom, in the event that he came to believe that he was about
to be killed in battle, he might begin using missiles or artillery
shells tipped with chemical or even biological weapons, thinking
that he had little more to lose. Thus an invasion might end up
producing the very outcome that it was intended to prevent, the
Iraqi use of WMD (Biden & Lugar).
 At the other end of the spectrum of U.S. options, it seems
clear that continuing the status quo of sanctions and no-fly zones
will not persuade Saddam Hussein to dismantle his WMD programs, let
alone to step down and permit free elections! Although the present
policy has successfully contained some of his ambitions, the
sanctions pose real hardships on the Iraqi people. On the other
hand, unilaterally ending the sanctions would simply reward his
intransigence and enable him to escalate his military buildup.
 But perhaps there is better option than the present
standoff or the proposed invasion.
 As previously mentioned, Iraq has refused since 1998 to
allow UN officials to inspect its WMD facilities, even though it is
obligated to do so under the 1991 armistice. However, the U.S.
could begin again to insert WMD inspectors into Iraq, but this time
with enough military support (rapid-deployment troops, attack
helicopters, high-level fighter-bomber escorts) to deter the Iraqis
from molesting them. Saddam Hussein would only be able to resist
those inspections by attacking U.S. forces, which would risk
all-out war. UN inspectors would have the clout to go wherever
needed to destroy Iraq's WMD facilities and materials
 This option-with limited objectives and short of full-scale
invasion-would permit the Iraqi people to avoid being victimized
again by war. The downside is that Iraq may remain mired in
dictatorship for many more years unless its people can succeed in
deposing Saddam Hussein themselves, which is sadly an unlikely
prospect given the strength of his security apparatus.
 This brings us back to the invasion option. If Saddam
Hussein's forces could be completely defeated with little loss of
civilian lives-a big "if"-then Iraq would be in a position for the
first time in many decades to achieve political democratization,
respect for civil liberties, and sustained economic prosperity.
Iraq's people might well consider those goals worth the price of
being invaded (Francke).
David Perry teaches Ethics and Warfare at Santa Clara
University. Additional information about him is online at http://home.earthlink.net/~davidlperry/mycv.htm
Joseph Biden and Richard Lugar, "Debating Iraq," New York Times, 31
Anthony Cordesman, testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 31 July 2002.
Charles Duelfer, ibid.
Rend Rahim Francke, ibid., 1 August 2002.
Robert Gallucci, ibid., 31 July 2002.
Morton Halperin, ibid.
Khidhir Hamza, ibid.
Phebe Marr, ibid., 1 August 2002.
Greg Miller and John Hendren, "Saddam Plans Urban War," Seattle
Times, 8 August 2002.
Steven Mufton, "Scowcroft Urges Restraint against Iraq," Washington
Post, 5 August 2002.
Jack Rakove, "Who Declares a War?" New York Times, 4 August
Eric Schmitt, "Hussein Foes Hold U.S. Talks as Capitol Hill Unease
Grows," New York Times, 9 August 2002.
Thom Shanker, "Bush Hears Options Including Baghdad Strike," New
York Times, 7 August 2002.
Daniel Simpson, "Turkey Warns U.S. of Difficulties in an Assault on
Baghdad," New York Times, 22 July 2002.
Shibley Telhami, testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 31 July 2002.
Patrick Tyler, "Europeans Split with U.S. on Need for Iraq Attack,"
New York Times, 22 July 2002.
George Will, "Put War up to a Vote," San Jose Mercury News, 8