Previous: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part II: The Interplay between Religion and
Power in Islam
[15] Long before the Muslim jurists undertook to provide religious
rationale for the historical practice of jih_d by developing
political-legal terminology like d_r al-isl_m (the sphere of
"submission" [to God]) and d_r al-harb (the sphere of war), the
Qur'an had implicitly divided the world into d_r al-im_n (the
sphere of belief) and d_r al-kufr (the sphere of disbelief). There
is, however, a difference in the way the revealed law, the Shari'a,
defined the two spheres and the way the Qur'an projected the realm
of "belief" and "disbelief." For Islamic law the division of the
world into the spheres of "submission to God" and "war" was in
terms of spatial-temporal as well as religious hegemony of Islam;
whereas for the Qur'an the spatial division was simply in terms of
spiritual and moral distinction between the spheres of "belief" and
"disbelief."
[16] Mecca was regarded as the sphere of "disbelief" as long as
the people of Mecca had not accepted Islam. The "submission" of the
people to the Islamic order brought about the conversion of Mecca
to the sphere of "belief." The religious distinction is thus
attached to the spiritual-moral condition of the people, and not
necessarily to the land where everyone should aspire to return as
part of the divine promise. There are no prophetic promises in
Islam, resembling those in Judaism, for instance, that would make
Muslims undertake jih_d to return from the "diaspora" to their
"holy land" located somewhere in Arabia. Moreover, there are no
divine guarantees that once the sphere of "belief" is established
it will not revert to the sphere of "disbelief." The maintenance of
the sphere of "belief" from turning into a corrupt and tyrannical
sphere of "disbelief" is a human responsibility. Furthermore, there
is no covenant between God and Muslims that certain parts of earth
will be immune from becoming corrupt and unjust. Ultimately, human
response to the divine challenge of becoming morally and
spiritually attentive would decide the sacredness or otherwise of
any part of earth. It was in such a conception of Islam as a
political ideology for the entire world that the tension between
the Qur'anic sanction of jih_d as a defensive strategy in the face
of persecution, and jih_d as a means of "calling" (al-da'wa) people
to divine path was discernible.1 The tension is between the
religious destiny of humanity which must be negotiated between God
and individuals without coercion from any human agency, including
that of the Prophet, and the moral responsibility of living as a
member of a society with well defined rights and obligations.
Muslim jurists and exegetes were engaged in legitimizing the jih_d
for purposes of "calling" persons to Islam - thus rendering the
jih_d a form of holy war. On the one hand, there was the problem of
reconciling an evident discrepancy between the Qur'anic treatment
of the jih_d as means to make "God's cause succeed" (8:39) and the
manipulation of jih_d by the de facto Muslim authorities to
increase the "sphere of submission [to God]" by engaging in
territorial expansion. There is, further, the tension between
religious and moral justifications for the jih_d, which although
not explicitly distinguished in Islamic jurisprudence are, at any
rate, alluded to in the Qur'an. Undoubtedly, tangible political
circumstances forced the jurists to be pragmatic and realistic in
their formulation of the justifications for undertaking jih_d,
especially if the de facto rulers were willing to uphold the
supremacy of Islamic law in a Muslim public order. In the process
of providing a religious legitimation for the territorial
expansionism of the Muslim rulers, the jurists preferred on many
occasions to overlook those passages of the Qur'an that point
toward moral justifications of jih_d ('fight until there is no
persecution'). Consequently, their rationalization of the jih_d as
the means by which the entire world might be converted to the
"sphere of Islam" obscures the Qur'anic concept of the jih_d in the
meaning of a defensive war fought to stop persecution.
[17] The difficulty of keeping the moral and religious
justifications for engaging in jih_d separate in Islamic
jurisprudence was inevitable because at no point did Muslim jurists
ever undertake to distinctly define the ethical and religious
foundations of the Islamic legal thought. Moreover, because of the
interdependence between religion and politics in the creation of an
Islamic world order, Muslim legal authority was envisaged as a
comprehensive power that exacted moral and civil obedience in the
name of God. The promise of the creation of a just and equitable
public order under the normative Shari'a that embodied the will of
God was central to Islamic revelation and also to the social,
political, and economic activity of the Muslim community. The
connection between the divine will and the creation of such an
order was fundamental in the jurists' regarding of the jih_d as an
instrument in the fulfillment of the ideal Muslim society. Thus, it
was not difficult to interpret the Qur'an in such a way that the
relatively limited justification for jih_d contained in the sacred
text was broadened to associate jih_d with the concept of justice
and divine guidance and with the desire to secure the well-being of
the entire humanity.
[18] In the wake of the phenomenal conquests achieved by Muslims
during the 1st/7th century, the jurists began to apply the term
jih_d to military action and to efforts to expand the "sphere of
Islam" through the extension of the boundaries of the Islamic
polity. The juridical works produced during the 2nd/8th century
provide the evidence that the treatment of the jih_d in connection
with the task of converting the "sphere of war" (d_r al-harb) to
the sphere of Islam was, in effect, an ex post facto legitimation
of the early conquests. In fact, the division of the world into two
spheres of "war" and "peace (isl_m)" was a legal construct based on
the Muslim jurists' inference from the implicit Qur'anic division
of the world into the spheres of "belief" (im_n) and "disbelief"
(kufr).
[19] That there is a relationship between the "call to faith"
(al-da'wa) and the undertaking of jih_d is supported by the
insistence of the Qur'an that it has been revealed for the purpose
of making the entire world aware of the divine path, and of
requiring humanity to obey God and the Prophet. But what are the
means that the Prophet may use to exact this obedience? Does the
Qur'an justify jih_d in this connection?
[20] The Qur'an gives the Prophet, in his capacity as the leader
of the Muslim community, the right to control "discord on earth" by
means of jih_d. This right points to the possibility -even
obligation- for the Prophet to resort to jih_d when, in his
judgement, such action is necessary as a means to combat a
breakdown of the public order. In particular, the Prophet may
resort to the sword in response to a situation of general
lawlessness that results from someone's "taking up arms against God
and His messenger" (9:33-34), that is, from a rebellion against the
established Islamic order. The repeated injunction to eradicate
"corruption on earth," taken together with the Qur'anic
justification of a human institution that has the power to carry
out the function of "enjoining the good and forbidding the evil,"
(3:104, 110; 9:71) represents a religiously sanctioned basic
moral-civil requirement to protect the well-being of a human
community.
[21] In the light of the need to eradicate "corruption on earth"
and to "command the good and forbid the evil," the Qur'an provides
a sort of rationally derived moral basis for jih_d in Islam. To be
sure, the permission to use force in any form occurred, according
to the jurists, during the Medina period of the Prophet's ministry
(622 CE) when Muslims were given permission to fight back against
the "folk who broke their solemn pledges":
Will ye not fight a folk who broke their solemn pledges, and
purposed to drive out the Messenger and did attack you first?
(9:13)
If they withdraw not from you, and offer you not peace, and
refrain not their hand take them, and slay them wherever you come
to them; against them We have given you a clear authority.
(4:91-93)
[22] It is not difficult to adduce strictly defensive warfare,
justified on moral grounds (breach of contract, retaliation,
self-defense and so on), from this permission given to the Muslims
to use force. That is, the permission is to respond to the
rationally derived obligation to fight in retaliation for attacks
upon Muslims. Hence, the Qur'an justifies defensive jih_d, allowing
the Muslims to fight against and subdue hostile unbelievers who are
dangerous to the community, and whose actions show them to be
inimical to the success of God's cause. My categorization of the
Qur'anic jih_d as strictly a "defensive" jihad is based on the
absolute absence of any reference in the Qur'an that would justify
an "offensive" jih_d, that is, a jih_d undertaken to "convert" all
of humanity to Islam. As I shall demonstrate, the Muslim jurists,
especially the Shi'ites, had great difficulty in justifying the
"offensive" jih_d without the presence of a legitimate, divinely
designated authority of the infallible Imam who could protect
against the shedding of innocent blood.
[23] However, if the Qur'an had stopped at this duty of
self-defense against hostile forces, then the possibility of
offensive jih_d would have been altogether out of question. It also
requires the Prophet to strive to make "God's cause succeed." At
this point, the jih_d (the "struggle") becomes an offensive
endeavor in connection with efforts to bring about the kind of
world order that the Qur'an envisions.
[24] The possibility of offensive jih_d as a means in the
creation of the Islamic world order gives rise to the tension
between the tolerance advocated in the matters of religious destiny
of human beings, on the one hand, and active response encouraged
and even required against unbelievers "until there is no
persecution (fitna) and the religion be only for God,"(8:39), on
the other. If the divine commandment in 8:39 is interpreted in the
context provided by the general Qur'anic justification for engaging
in jih_d (as a response to aggression or moral wrong), it can be
construed in terms of a moral-civil duty to fight "persecution"
which, according to 2:191 "is worse than slaughter." On the other
hand, if the verse is interpreted in terms of the development of
Muslim political power, then it may be said to provide a warrant
for wars of expansion. Undoubtedly, Sunni jurists, in providing the
legitimacy of the Muslim conquests, duly regarded them as the
outcome of a Qur'anic jih_d. However, Muslim political history
clearly demonstrates that these conquests were undertaken with the
explicit aim of expanding Islamic hegemony, not with the goal, as
stated in the Qur'an, of ensuring that "the religion be only for
God." (8:39-40) This verse clearly states that fighting cannot be
started until the adversaries are first invited to come to the
right path. If they accept the call, there will be no fighting; but
if they reject it then "know that God is your Master; the most
excellent Master, and most excellent Helper." That means their
rejection of responding to the call of religion is beyond human
remedy. Only God can guide them to the right path. Further evidence
that the injunction to fight in this verse was morally restricted
is provided by the fact that some Muslim commentators regarded it
as abrogated by the more general command that requires Muslims to
fight in the verse 9:29, against "those who believe not in God and
the Last Day..." However, this verse refers to an entirely
different group of unbelievers. It speaks about the Peoples of the
Book. And, as pointed out earlier, offensive jih_d against the Jews
and the Christians "until they pay jizya (poll-tax)" (9:29) points
more to the complex relationship and interdependence of religious
and moral considerations in the treatment of the "Peoples of the
Book" than to their conversion to "God's religion," Islam.
[25] To recapitulate, if jih_d is understood within the notion
of human responsibility to strive for the success of God's cause,
consistently maintained by the Qur'an (9:41), then legitimizing the
use of force against moral and political offenses cannot be
regarded as contradicting the Qur'anic dictum of 2:256: "No
compulsion is there in religion." The Qur'an justifies the use of
force in the establishment of an order that protects the basic
welfare of the Muslim community against "internal" and "external"
enemies. The "internal" enemies include "tyrants" who, according to
the Qur'an, "fight against God and His messenger, and hasten about
the earth, to do corruption there" (5:33). "Fight" or "take up
arms" as the Arabic verb suggests, is taken to mean "subverting a
Muslim public order under God and His Messenger" leading to "chaos
and lawlessness." Hence, "tyrants" are those engaged in seditious
activity against the Muslim public order. The "external" enemies
include the "leaders of unbelief" who "break their oaths after
their covenant and thrust at your religion" (9:12) (i.e.,
non-Muslim Arabs) and the Peoples of the Book (i.e., Jews and
Christians), who "do not forbid what God and His messenger have
forbidden" (9:29), thereby obstructing the struggle to make "God's
cause succeed."
Next: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part IV: The Need for Legitimate Authority to
Sanction Violence in the Name of God
© February
2003
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 3, Issue 2
1 Discussion in this and the following section is based on my
earlier research on "The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation
and History," in Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and
Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition, ed. James
Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990),
pp. 35-50.