Previous: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part III: Jih_d as a Defensive Strategy or a
Means of "Calling"?
[26] The Prophet through the revelation, then, was not only
representing divine goals on earth; he was also engaged in
interpreting them to make them relevant in the given cultural
context. Any armed struggle like jih_d which, as the Qur'an admits,
was by nature reprehensible to humanity since it endangered its
sense of security and well-being, presupposed the existence of a
divinely designated authority that could resolve the problems of
the interpretability of supernaturally ordained obligation
involving violence and destruction of human life. Jih_d, as the
Muslim jurists correctly inferred, could not be waged without the
divine authority being invested in the Prophet or his successor,
who alone could justify the reasons and the ends for its
undertaking. No bloodshed was warranted if the religious-moral
goals were unclear or if there was no guarantee that it would
eradicate causes of corruption.
[27] It is in connection with this last statement that Shi'i
jurists, by contrast with the Sunni scholars, argued that the
presence of a divinely appointed leader (the Imam) would be a
necessary precondition of any offensive jih_d. The Sunni jurists
did not consider it a necessity that the leader of the Muslims be
divinely appointed Imam. Rather, they argued that any de facto
Muslim authority ought to advance the purposes of God in the jih_d.
This difference of opinion points to the fundamental differences
between the two schools of thought in the matter of right
authority. It also demonstrates their understanding of the
political history of Islam and of the connections of the Qur'anic
jih_d with that history.
[28] The Sunni jurists maintained that in the area of
constitutional affairs, the community should have a sovereign head
in charge of all its affairs, including the declaration of jih_d,
and bound to give effect to the general purposes of God for Islamic
society by ruling in accordance with the revealed law. This is
known as the legal doctrine of "governance in accordance with the
Shari'a (siy_sa shar'iyya)." The sovereign in the management of all
the affairs of state should always be prepared to consult the
community and to listen to the representations of the community.
Neither side was to act independently of the other or to impose its
own point of view. This was the tradition of the early Muslim
caliphs following the Prophet's death. However, ways to assure such
consultation and representation were not laid down in the juridical
texts to avoid rigidity in the matter of "governance in accordance
with the Shari'a" and to allow the political institution necessary
flexibility to adapt itself to varying future situations.
[29] Under the legal doctrine of the "governance in accordance
with the Shari'a," the Sunni jurists thought of the jih_d as a war
for the expansion of Islamic territory- i.e., the sphere where the
norms prescribed by the Shari'a would be paramount. In so doing,
they offered a religious rationale for the historic practice of
Muslim rulers, who are afforded an over-riding personal discretion
to determine, according to time and circumstances, how the purposes
of God for the Islamic community might be best effected.
[30] The Shi'i jurists did not regard the wars of expansion as
motivated by the Qur'an. In fact, it was the Shi'i scrutiny of the
Sunni explications of jih_d that gave rise to questions concerning
right authority: Who can declare the jih_d? While the majoritarian
Sunni jurisprudence is always conditioned by the historic practice
of the community, working out its ideas about jih_d with respect to
the reality of wars of conquest in the name of Islam, the minority
Shi'i jurisprudence characteristically focused on the
ideal.1 In the
absence of any need to rationalize political power, Shi'ite
juridical tradition could remain adamant concerning the questions
of right authority and just cause. The Shi'i jurists, therefore,
questioned the motives of the Sunni caliphs with respect to the
practice of war.2 The original purpose of
jih_d, they contended, was not preserved under the Sunni
rulers.
[31] For the Shi'i, offensive jih_d -the jih_d for the purpose
of calling upon people to respond to God's guidance by accepting
Islam- required the presence of the just, divinely appointed Imam,
not (as the Sunnites argued) just any de facto ruler under the
"governance of the Shari'a"; or, in the absence of the Imam, as is
the case with the last of the Shi'ite Imam in concealment, the
person deputized by him could authorize such a struggle. The
Shi'ite jurists made an explicit distinction between this offensive
jih_d and the defensive jih_d, which would protect the welfare of
the Muslim community against hostile aggression. The requirement of
just authority (in the case of offensive war) was supposed to
guarantee that the jih_d against the unbelievers would be waged
strictly for the cause of God. In fact, it is only the just Imam
who, by virtue of his divinely protected knowledge of Islamic
revelation, could initiate the jih_d against the unbelievers. More
importantly, it is only the just leader who can avoid errors of
judgement in critical matters like shedding of blood and ensure
that the jih_d is truly in accord with the goals of Islam. Sunni
jurists, although in agreement that there should be an Imam (in the
ordinary sense of a ruler and not a divinely appointed leader) to
lead the jih_d for the purpose of calling people to Islam, are in
disagreement with the Shi'i in regard to the necessity of the
infallible Imam's permission for the initiation of such a
jih_d.
[32] However, the question of obtaining the permission of the
Imam does not arise in defensive warfare, because defense, the
Shi'i argue, is a moral requirement founded upon such Qur'anic
passages as 2:190-91. Moreover, the Shi'i jurists assert that from
the tenth century on when the last Imam went in concealment the
obligation to engage in offensive jih_d has lapsed until the
messianic leader reappears in future. But the Imam's absence has no
connection to the discharging of the obligation of self-defense.
Whenever the Muslims are attacked by enemies, and they fear for the
safety of the boundaries and peoples of Islam, it is their duty to
undertake defensive measures and defend themselves against those
who threaten their security. This defense, as the Shi'ite jurists
remind their followers, should be undertaken with the intention of
repelling the enemy only. All forms of defense, against those who
attacked Muslims, against those who want to kill and drive away
people from their homes, and against those who rise up against a
just ruler, were regarded as "defense" rather than strict jih_d in
the meaning of furthering the cause of God against unbelief among
the human race. It was also in this sense of defense, that Muslims
living in d_r al-sulh (the "sphere of peace"), as a minority under
non-Muslim government in peace and were able to practice their
religion freely, had the military obligation to fight in defence of
d_r al-sulh.3
Evidently, the obligation of self-defense was regarded universal
enough to require Muslims, whether Shi'i or Sunni, living under any
government to undertake proper measures for self-preservation.
[34] Sunni jurisprudence based its notions of jih_d on the
existence of an authority invested with political power to preserve
and maintain the public order and to protect the Islamic norms from
being infringed or tampered with from inside or from outside.
Consequently, Sunni jurists did not feel the need to pursue the
discussion concerning the various types of jih_d or the diverse
justifications for it, because all types of warfare were afforded
religious legitimation. By contrast, Shi'i jurists presupposed
their own lack of power. Hence, their indulgence in the exercise of
defining the goals, the preconditions, the various types of jih_d,
and so on. Moreover, Shi'i political jurisprudence was not
justified in its theoretical formulations about jih_d by the actual
historic practice of the Muslim community. Consequently, there is a
substantial discussion in the works of the Shi'i jurists concerning
moral and religious restrictions on use of violence in making God's
cause succeed- the knowledge of that being restricted to the
infallible Imam.
[35] In the final analysis, from the point of comparative
perspectives on the ethics of war, jih_d in its Qur'anic ordainment
made it possible for Muslims to assert that the only "just" war is
one fought for religious purposes under the legitimate political
authority.4 The
reason is that concern for peace which has led to the visions of a
just society has also required the proscriptions on use of force,
in particular legal force to procure that peace. Just war tradition
even in the West in general is connected with the desire to strive
and to achieve true peace by removing the causes of conflict.
Accordingly, violent or nonviolent approaches to confrontation in
Islam has depended upon the ultimate outcome of the conflict.
Next: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part V: The Law of Rebellion
© February
2003
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 3, Issue 2
1 In the chapter on the
Shi&=javascript:goNote(39ite theory of political authority in
my The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of
the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), pp. 105-117 I have discussed the intimate
relationship between jih_d and the question of right authority in
Twelver Shi'ite jurisprudence.
2 There are a number of narratives related in the
Shi&=javascript:goNote(39ite sources that question the
legitimacy of the various jih_ds of the Sunni caliphs as motivated
by the Qur'anic demand to make God's cause succeed. See: Mumammad
B_qir al-MajlisA, Bim_r al-anw_r (Tehran: Kit_bfur_shA-yi
Isl_miyya, 1957), Volume 100, p. 18f.
3 Dar al-sulh as a spatial-religious conception conveys
the essence of Muslim cognition of their emigration in the
non-Muslim countries. It provides a Muslim minority with the legal
and ethical sources for furthering the ways that are necessary to
relate themselves as members of a family and a community in
predominantly non-Muslim environment. Closely related to this
concept is the notion of d_r al-mijra (the sphere of emigration)
which not only suggests that every corner of the earth is open to
such emigration to seek God&=javascript:goNote(39s universal
bounty; it also considers any part of the earth unrestrictedly and
potentially capable of providing humanity with all necessary
conditions to direct it toward obedience to God. See my article on:
"Islam and Muslims in Diaspora," in the Bulletin of the Institute
of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan,
Volume 7, March 1993, pp. 109-146.
4 John Kelsay, Islam and War: The Gulf War and Beyond, A
Study in Comparative Ethics (Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), p.
2.