[1] A note on comparative approach is appropriate in a study
which, like this one1, attempts to identify common
ground on a particular issue shared by the Western monotheistic
traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Comparative studies
in religion have been generally criticized for oversimplifying the
complex and intricate variations and divergences within each
tradition for the purpose of typifying them in broad terms. Whereas
it is not difficult to catalog broad categories like prophetic
consciousness, the function of revelation and the religious-moral
guidance based on it, and the salvation history shared by the
Abrahamic faiths, special attention needs to be paid to the
historical circumstances and social-political experiences of the
respective communities that interacted with their religious
orientation and shaped their attitudes, decisions, and actions.
[2] To be sure, the three basic ingredients of the religiously
inspired world view are: (1) fundamental principles of the creed
that provide the authoritative perspectives for interpreting
contradictions and tensions in human existence; (2) the
dispositions that are evoked by these perspectives; and, (3) the
religious practices that reinforce both the creed and the
disposition generated by it by means of special rituals and
practices.2
When these basic ingredients are examined and verified against the
relevant literature produced by the group within what Max Weber
calls the "internal structure of cultural values" by which a
religious community justifies its adoption of a practical solution
to the ontological anxieties caused by existing fear of death and
uncertain future, they may reveal the intricate relationship
between the tradition and its contextual formulations and
reinterpretations within a specific time and space.
[3] It is possible to assert from the outset that in
investigating the particular attitude regarding political
quietism3and
pacifism4 in
Western monotheistic traditions, the believers' opposition to or
resignation in the face of all violent means of attaining a
divinely ordained order would be settled in large measure by the
way in which the religion maintained its relationship with power
and legitimized the authority that exacted obedience to that power
in the name of a sacred authority. In other words, Islamic views on
activism or quietism, for instance, are part of a theory of
statecraft which defines the state as a means to promoting the
common good and as an instrument founded on the notions of an
omnipotent, omniscient and just God, of a humanity endowed with
volition and cognition, and of relations between the divine and
human will and act. There is little doubt that the beliefs,
attitudes, and practices of the religious subject demonstrate the
intricate developing relationship within the context of
socio-political history between the authoritative and determinative
teachings of a tradition and the emerging power to implement them
as normative for the creation of the religious polity. Moreover,
the beliefs and attitudes also determine the way the followers of
that tradition deal with the question of resistance and opposition
to the abuse of power or submission to it. Furthermore, the
ultimate outcome of this historical interplay between religion and
power is also reflected in the way people have responded to the
need to confront the obstacles to the realization of the idealized
vision of a religious polity on earth. In other words, religious
idealism has to interact with the realities that members of a given
society must reckon with and continuingly reevaluate it to make it
relevant in current circumstances.
Next: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part II: The Interplay between Religion and
Power in Islam
© February
2003
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 3, Issue 2
1 This article developed out of the two papers presented
at two conferences held during 1993-94. The first part was
presented at the "Conference on Quietism and Pacifism in the
Western Monotheistic Traditions" at Washington University; and the
second part was presented at the "Conference on Religious
Perspectives on Pacifism and Non-Violence in Situations of
International Conflict" at the United States Institute of Peace. I
would like to acknowledge my appreciation of the suggestions
offered by the readers of the early draft of the work, and incisive
criticisms offered by my colleagues and friends Professors James
Childress at UVa and David Little at USIP.
2 David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Religious
Ethics: A New Method (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p.
54-55.
3 I assume that in the present context quietism refers to
political quietism and hence, is not to be confused with the
quietism in the meaning of the late seventeenth-century devotional
movement of the Catholic Church in Italy and France. See article
QUIETISM in The Encyclopedia of Religion, Ed. Mircea Eliade (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 19..), Vol. 12/153-155.
4 Pacifism in the sense of nonviolence in the context of
the visions of a perfect society based on social harmony and
peaceful living is a relatively new term in the English language.
However, pacifism in the meaning of nonviolent approach to
confrontation, even in oppressive situations has been present in
the Abrahamic traditions as something divinely ordained in response
to conflict. The corollary of such a requirement is the suffering
of martyrdom (kiddush ha Shem in Judaism and shah_da in Islam
connote bearing witness to the divine order) by sacrificing
one&=javascript:goNote(39s life. See: article NONVIOLENCE in
The Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 10/463-467.