Previous: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part VIII: Quietism rather than Pacifism in
Islam
[64] The readiness to give up one's life for a goal beyond oneself
presupposes a free human agent who could engage in risk- benefit
analysis and decide to risk his life for a just cause. There is
considerable agreement among Muslims that the precise direction in
the matter involving endangering one's own or the lives of other in
the community should be determined with a renewed commitment to the
activist precepts of Islam. It was not always possible to undertake
the moral obligation of "commanding good and forbidding evil"
without actively seeking to order society in a manner consistent
with the guidance given to humanity by its Creator. Moreover, the
existence of the legitimate authority invested with God's
sovereignty to fulfil divine purposes was important in view of the
Qur'anic injunction requiring obedience to God, the Prophet and to
those invested with political authority. (4:59) In other words, as
pointed out earlier, in Islam it was not possible to gain the
authoritative and determinative guidance for the common good
without considering constitutional questions as to who is
authorized to determine a quietist or an activist direction and by
what procedures.
[65] It is important to emphasize that the question of
legitimate authority in determining the goals of divine revelation
and the means to implement them has been central to Islam as a
comprehensive social and political system. At no time did the
Muslim community abandon its vision of a qualified leadership to
create the Islamic polity. Indeed, religious leadership is the
single most important issue that has divided the community and has
provoked debates about the justification of engaging in religiously
sanctioned violence to establish or dethrone it. Political activism
in Islam has been intimately related to the establishment of
Islamic public order under the qualified leadership of a Caliph or
an Imam. On the other hand, quietism as a legitimate tactic for the
community living under adverse settings was always determined by
the religious leadership (either of the caliph/imam or the ulema,
the jurist-theologians, who acted as juridical authority in the
community) that was denied the right to head the Islamic
polity.
[66] There were precedents in the political history of Islam as
well as the teachings of the Qur'an for the exponents of both the
postures of activism and quietism. A close examination of the
arguments used to support one or the other posture reveals that the
problem was related to government and obedience. The sole
justification for the existence of the government, according to the
Qur'an, was "commanding the good and forbidding the evil." This
moral justification also made it morally as well as religiously
obligatory to obey the government that undertook to implement that
duty.
[67] The Sunni and Shi'i division of the Muslim community was
based on their respective views about the legitimate government
under the Caliph/Imam. The problem faced by the Muslim community
was a classic one in the world history, namely, how to reconcile
the discrepancy between the promised ideal and the existing real?
In other words, how should the faithful respond to the existing
problems of injustices and distortions that had propped up in
upholding the duty of "commanding the good and forbidding the
evil"?
[68] The obvious question that arises in the minds of pious
Muslims when they confront unjust government that fails to command
good and interdict evil, whether personally or collectively, is:
"Do Muslims have an obligation to take arms to oppose or expunge
tyranny and corruption within the community?" In other words: "Is
obedience to the government that leads to disobedience to God to be
tolerated?" The response to the question of perceived injustices
has depended upon the current socio-political circumstances and has
been determined by the political and religious leadership.
[69] Bernard Lewis in his lectures on The Political Language of
Islam1 has
traced the development of activist and quietist tradition in the
political writings of the classical age. In earlier times, as he
has shown, the question of obedience to the legitimate authority
and the legality of those who exacted obedience in his name was
critical for the community. In other words, the manner in which
authority was acquired was important to determine the level of
obedience that accrued to that authority. With the passage of time,
more particularly, when power was seized by force, the question of
legality of power was abandoned in favor of the manner in which
power was exercised, because the reality was that political
leadership had passed on to those who possessed little legitimacy
in their claim to obedience. The only source of their legal claim
to obedience, as the Muslim jurists came to recognize and require
of the community, was their respect for the Islamic legal norms.
The concept of the sovereign being bound to rule according to the
legal norms, the Shari'a, meant that his supreme duty was the
protection of public interest. To this end he was given an
overriding personal discretion to decide how the Islamic norms for
the community might be best effected. This principle, as discussed
earlier, is known as "government in accordance with the revealed
law (siy_sa shar'iyya)." As a legal accommodation with existing
political power it became the precedent for activist pacifism, as
discussed above.
[70] Throughout this development Muslim jurists in their
endeavors to rationalize the existing power had required obedience
on the part of the Muslim subject. Thus, in addition to the
numerous traditions like the one cited on the authority of the
Prophet, who advised Hudhayfa, his close associate, to listen and
obey the political leader "even if he beats you on the back and
confiscates your property, you must only listen and obey," the
tenth-century manbali jurist Ibn Bamma (d. 387/997) observed:
You must abstain and refrain
from sedition (fitna). You must not rise in arms against the imams,
even if they be unjust. 'Umar b. al-Khamm_b, may God be pleased
with him, said: "If he oppresses you be patient; if he dispossess
you, be patient." The Prophet, may God bless and save him, said to
Ab_ Dharr: "Be patient, even if he be an Ethiopian
slave."2
[71] There are other traditions that contradict the above
narratives attributed to the Caliph 'Umar and the Prophet himself.
But their purpose in the tenth century is obvious, namely, it was
to justify the authoritarian power of the ruling sovereign and to
give unquestioning obedience however unjust the sovereign might be.
In fact, majority of the writers on statecraft argued for the
rights of authority and the necessity of obedience rather than the
duty of challenging authority. Such challenging on balance proved
to be more harmful to the common good. Thus, at times tolerance of
injustice was necessary to avoid civil strife (fitna).
[72] The use of the word fitna in Sunni traditions carries the
notion of quietist passivity and hence, a negative connotation as
far as Islamic teaching on just ethical order is concerned.
Moreover, for the Sunni majority, it is a term that evokes bitter
recollection of the great rift in the Muslim community shortly
after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. This conflict, later
dubbed the "Great fitna" (al-fitna al-kubr_) or the "first fitna,"
pitted some of the closest associates of the Prophet against each
other and led to major schisms in the community. The conflict was
never fully resolved, but its memory in retrospect left a deep
impression among the Sunnis that the best stance in a conflict
situation was simply to adopt quietist passivity.
[73] The alternative, namely, fighting injustice and "forbidding
the evil," as the Qur'anic ethics required, was regarded by these
scholars to lead to some scandal in the shape of a serious ensuing
disturbance or strife.3 Thus, fitna was associated
with undesirable change and consequently, it implied reliving the
political experiences connected with leadership struggles, disputes
and conflict of interests. It was to be avoided at any cost, even
if it meant side-stepping the Qur'anic demand for "commanding the
good and forbidding the evil," and the ensuing defensive jih_d to
restore peace with justice.
[74] Nevertheless, fitna as an experience of the first Muslim
community has not, as an idea, entirely shaped Muslim attitude of
authoritarian quietism. Rather, actual social changes and
historical recollection together produced the consciousness of
fitna as a delimiting and debilitating factor in social exigencies.
The consciousness of fitna has grown and matured around a continual
series of historical re-interpretations of the first civil strife
in the light of new emerging sedition. While the first civil strife
has acted as a prototype, other civil wars and disturbances have
continually affected the Muslims' historical perception of it. The
term fitna, therefore, acts and continues to act as a description,
a justification and a recipe for quietism, and even inaction.
[75] Emmanuel Sivan has rightly alluded to this situation as a
"trauma" in Muslim attempts to redress grave social and political
injustices.4
The apprehension involved in taking an activist stand looms so
large in Sunni political understanding that even contemporary
revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qumb and Sa'Ad mawwa have had
to go to great lengths to justify revolutionary activity if it may
lead to some form of civil disturbance. The only way they could
justify activism was to declare the disbelief of modern governments
and Muslim societies against whom waging jih_d was a legitimate
step. Even that was a departure from the generally held Sunni
position that the ruler, even if he be a sinner, must be obeyed as
long as he respects the basic minimum. Some jurists, however,
conceded that while a sinful sovereign must be obeyed, the same
privilege might not be extended to agents of the sovereign who are
sinful.
[76] Sinful rule and tyrannical government, according to the
authoritarian quietist view, are not the greatest evils, because
the alternative to such a rule is chaos. Anything that disrupted
the authority that was necessary to guarantee the unity of
community and to provide the legality to the execution of the most
fundamental objective of government, namely, to enable Muslims to
live the good Muslim life was to be regarded as sinful deviation
from the right tradition. Hence, through the centuries, quietism
has been legitimized as a religious duty to maintain order in
Muslim community.
[77] Yet this legitimization would not have been possible
without creating a creed that viewed the divine being as the
Absolute Sovereign, the All-Powerful God, who determined every
action of humanity, leaving it completely helpless in the divine
plan for human history. When God, as the Omnipotent Being, could do
as he willed, so could the ruler, who was symbolized as the "Shadow
of God on earth." All these ideas were part of the doctrinal
development in Sunni theology and the related field of political
thought.
[78] For the exponents of an activist posture in the community
the question of obedience and disobedience was posed in the context
of early divisive civil wars that split the Islamic state and
community, and ultimately the Islamic religion. The paradigm was
provided by the second fitna, when the Caliph 'Uthm_n (d. 656 A.D.)
was attacked and killed by Muslim Arab rebels. In the course of the
argument two basic positions emerged. According to the one, 'Uthm_n
was both a rightful and just ruler, and his killing was therefore
both a crime and a sin. According to the other, 'Uthm_n was a
wrongful and unjust ruler, and his killing was therefore a lawful
and a necessary act. In time, and after a long and complex
evolution, these two viewpoints became associated with two
traditions: the one with the Sunni, the other with Shi'ite Islam.
It would be an oversimplification to identify the Sunnis with the
quietist and the Shi'a with the activist tradition. The Sunnis,
throughout their history, produced their own radicals. The Shi'a
evolved their own doctrines, decisions, and practices of passive
submission.
[79] To be sure, activist radicalism was at times invoked in
specific legal terms to make lawful disobedience to existing unjust
regimes, or their forcible overthrow. However, the response to the
armed revolt against unjust government in Shi'ism was offered by
examining whether such an action is justifiable without the
leadership of a divinely appointed Imam, or whether any individual
qualified Shi'ite could undertake to fight the tyranny and
corruption of his time when it reached an intolerable level.
Historically the guidance of the Shi'ite jurists, whether leading
to radical political action or otherwise, turned on their
interpretation of the two basic doctrines intrinsic to an
authoritative perspective that organizes the mundane existence of
Shi'ite Muslims. These two doctrines are the justice of God and the
leadership of the righteous individuals. Undergirding the social,
political, and economic activity in the early centuries was the
promise of Islamic revelation that only through obedience to God
could believers accomplish the establishment of a just and
equitable public order embodying the will of God. The promise was
buttressed by the certainty that God is just and truthful. Divine
justice demanded that God do what was best for humanity, and divine
truthfulness generated the faith that God's promise would be
fulfilled if humanity kept its covenant of working toward a truly
godly life.
[80] The proof that God is just and truthful was provided by his
creating the rational faculty in human beings and sending
revelation through the prophets to guide them toward the creation
of an ethical world order. The indispensable connection between
divine guidance and the creation of an ethical world order provided
an ideological mandate for the interdependency of the religious and
the political in Islam. It also pointed to some sort of divine
intervention being necessary in the creation of a just society.
Consequently, the focal point of the Islamic belief system
envisions the Prophet and his properly designated successors as
representing God on earth--the God who invested authority in them
in order for them to rule over mankind rightly. In other words, the
linkage between the divine investiture and the creation of an
Islamic world order became a salient feature of Islamic ideological
discourse almost from the beginning.
[81] However, the essential connection between the religious and
the political became an underlying source of crises in the Muslim
community. The early history of Islam witnessed discontent among
all Muslims. Some were moved by profound religious conviction and
deep moral purpose to seek activist political steps to confront
injustices. The period, moreover, generated much discussion and
deliberation regarding the duty of obedience to an unjust ruler who
caused disobedience to God.
[82] The notion of revolution to overthrow unjust authority
favored by radical elements in the Shi'ite community took a
different turn when the manifest leadership of their Imams came to
an end in the tenth century. With this end the activist ideology
took on an apocalyptic cast: the revolution would come in a future
time of fulfillment when the restorer of pristine Islam, the Mahdi,
would appear. This belief in the future messianic role of the Imam
has served a complex, and seemingly paradoxical function. It has
been the guiding doctrine behind both an activist political
posture, calling upon believers to remain alert and prepared at all
times to launch the revolution with the messianic Imam who might
appear at any time, and behind a quietist waiting for God's decree,
in almost fatalistic resignation, in the matter of the return of
this Imam at the End of Time.5 In both cases the main
problem was to determine the right course of action at a given time
in a given social and political setting. The adoption of the
activist or quietist solution depended upon the interpretation of
conflicting traditions attributed to the Shi'ite Imams about the
circumstances that justified radical action. Resolution of the
contradiction in these traditions in turn was contingent upon the
agreement about, and acknowledgement of, the existence of an
authority who could make the messianic Imam's will known to the
community. Without such a learned authority among the Shi'ites, it
was practically impossible to acquire reliable knowledge about
whether a government had indeed become evil, and whether a radical
solution was an appropriate form of struggle against it.
Next: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part X: Concluding Remarks
© February
2003
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 3, Issue 2
1 Published by University of Chicago Press, 1988,
particularly Chapter 5.
2 'Ubayd All_h b. Muhammad b. Bamma Kit_b al-sharm wa
al-ib_na 'al_ um_l al-sunna wa al-diy_na (Damascus, 1958), p.
66ff.
3 See A. K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval
Islam: An introduction to the study of Islamic political theory:
the jurists (Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 15-16.
4 Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and
Modern Politics (Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 90, 96-7.
5 For detailed treatment of the messianic idea in
Shi&=javascript:goNote(39ism see my Islamic Messianism: The
Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism (Albany: State University of New
York, 1981).