Previous: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part IV: The Need for Legitimate Authority to
Sanction Violence in the Name of God
[36] The Prophet's injunction to avoid strife and wrongdoing has
served as an important principle in the adoption of political
quietism or pacifist activism in some sectors of the Muslim
community. In general, the law in Islam prohibits rebellion under
almost any condition because it expresses a requirement of
proportionality by warning that opposition to an unjust government
should not result in greater discord than that which is being
suffered. The government as an instrument for the common good, with
its legitimacy hinging on the condition of providing means of
fulfilling the religious-moral obligations of Islam under a just
authority, was always an important consideration in conceding the
right of rebellion. In situations of rebellion against the Muslim
government, the law discusses the criteria relevant to rebellion
(al-baghy) which serve to distinguish its participants from
apostates and brigands. Muslim jurists define an insurgent as
someone who commits an act of insurrection (khur_j), with a reason
or interpretation, while enjoying wide support or power (shawka).
In the absence of a 'reason' or 'power', the party in question is
treated as a common criminal and not an insurgent.
[37] A rebellion may be justified because of what is ascribed to
the Prophet who said: "If people see an oppressor and they do not
hinder him, then God will punish all of them."1 The tradition somehow
requires a communitarian response to the oppressive situation in
the society. Accordingly, the criterion of 'power'(shawka)
functions as a safeguard against an individual taking upon himself
to correct the social and political ill. The insurgent group must
demonstrate wide support in order to be recognized as having
somewhat equal standing with the authority against which it is
rising. The form of organization, leadership and membership reduces
the possibility of anarchy and lawlessness arising from a corrupt
person inventing a justification and claiming to be a rebel. This
requirement is consistent with the Islamic concern for the
community and the protection of Islamic order. In the case of
collective rebellion the group itself essentially functions as a
community and is concerned with the preservation of Islamic values
rather than motivated by individual self-interest. The action is
undertaken by public mandate, not by private initiative. It is only
then and only if the justification for rebellion provided by the
legitimate group that wishes to oppose the state is valid and the
Imam concedes it, that the law rules that the Imam should be liable
for disorder, not the rebels. Additionally, even though both sides
of the conflict may have some legitimacy, Islamic law acknowledges
the likely power discrepancy between the state and the opposition
by exempting the rebels from liability for any harm to property or
life occurring during the course of rebellion.2
[38] However, rebels should not use this power discrepancy as a
way to justify the use of any violent means necessary to achieve
their goals. There are some among Muslim jurists who taking the
side of the insurgent group argue that the justness of the
rebellion renders considerations of moral restriction on the use of
violent means irrelevant, thereby allowing acts of terrorism and
the like. On the other hand, there are those jurists who support
the state in reasoning that the legitimate authority of the state,
i.e. the Imam, when compared with the lack of such authority among
the rebels, has the right to put down insurrections using any means
necessary as well.3 Moreover, in terms of the
balance of power, those engaging in guerilla or terrorist practices
commonly argue that their weaker position necessitates the use of
such violent tactics in order for their resistance to the state to
be possible.
[39] These arguments embody the concern evident in the debates
about the Qur'anic jih_d and jih_d in Islamic history where the
overemphasis on the importance of the justifications of war led to
the relative neglect of limits on use of violence to secure
victory. However, in the law of rebellion in Islam the emphasis is
on the means of resistance employed by rebels than the ends they
seek. After all, in essence, the law is actually engaged in
regulating rebellion by Muslims living under an Islamic order. The
rebels are not legally classified as criminals and are required to
observe moral restrictions in seeking redress to injustices. Thus,
the primary concern when rebellion occurs in the Muslim community
is to find ways of reconciling the contending parties and
reestablish order.
[40] In sum, the law dealing with rebellion in Islam is
comprehensive and coherent, which does not negate the possibility
of rebellion, but encompasses it within a framework designed to be
just and to promote a stable community whatever adversary prevails.
Since one cannot resist an unjust tyrant unless such resistance
would result in less harm to common good than that suffered under
the unjust government itself, the law takes the position that the
means of such resistance must be ordered toward preserving the
common good as well. Therefore, it views acts of terrorism as
illicit in that they would tend to create more societal disorder
than that caused by the unjust government. Despite the potential
difficulty of implementing the right conduct, especially the
criterion of discrimination, in irregular warfare, Muslim jurists
tend to place more emphasis on the means of resistance employed by
the rebels rather than the ends they seek, by using the same
principle of proportionality which they invoke in the defensive
jih_d.
[41] The law of rebellion in Islam, accordingly, points to the
activist response demanded by the Qur'an to eradicate "corruption
on earth." As a reaction to the recognized right of the people to
prevent acts of injustices, within the limits imposed by concerns
of proportionality and forewarning, a new opinion removing such a
responsibility from the people emerged. A number of Muslim scholars
believed in the postponement of the decisive judgement upon a
Muslim's belief or conduct until the Day of Judgement when God
Himself would deal with such individuals and reward or punish them
for their behavior. This attitude led to some kind of moral
complacency because what it meant was that a Muslim retains his/her
membership in the community even if he/she fails to uphold the
moral conduct prescribed by the faith. It also suggested that no
one beside God can judge a person's real faith and conduct. In
support of this attitude many traditions attributed to the Prophet
were circulated to justify the tyrannical rule of the Muslim
dynasty like that of the Umayyads. Most of these traditions,
although accepted by the community at large, are in direct
contradiction to the teachings of the Qur'an. Thus, for instance,
the Prophet is reported to have advised one of his close
associates, Hudhayfa:
"After me there shall be political leaders who will not be
guided by my instruction nor shall they follow my custom (sunna).
Moreover, there shall rise among them men whose hearts shall be the
hearts of devil in the frame of human bodies."
Hudhayfa asked: "What shall I do when I find myself in such a
situation?"
The Prophet replied: "You must listen and obey the political
leader; even if he beats you on the back and confiscates your
property, you must listen and obey."4
Such traditions were actually used to rationalize the concrete
situation in the community and to argue for the prohibition of
rebellion against an established state.
[42] Nevertheless, such admonitions must be understood within
the internal structures of the cultural values that require a
connection of peace with justice and encourage the achievement of
an ideal just social order ensuring that war, whether regular or
irregular, will not be more destructive to society. Peace which not
only signifies the absence of warfare but also a perfect state of
well-being and harmony, as Islam sees it, is the product of order
with justice. Just as private individuals must show proper
restraint in self-defense, public officials must also ensure that
judicial rulings are reflective of justice and equity. While one
ought not despise the peace that comes from a simple avoidance of
strife, one must always be aware that such peace is uneasy, and
that conflict is always a possibility in oppressive
situations.
Next: Justification for
Violence in Islam, Part VI: Pacifist Activism in Islamic Legal
System
© February
2003
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 3, Issue 2
1 The tradition occurs in many variant forms, with a clear
permission to enjoin the oppressor. See: al-NawawA, Riy_m
al-m_limAn (Beirut, D_r al-madAth, 1974), p. 109.
2 Khalid Abou El Fadl, "Amk_m Al-Bugh_t: Irregular Warfare
and the Law of Rebellion in Islam," in Cross, Crescent, and Sword:
The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic
Tradition, ed. by James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 162 cites all the relevant juridical
sources on the issue.
3 Anwar Sadat&=javascript:goNote(39s assassins relied
on the righteousness of the duty of jih_d to validate their
questionable method of irregular warfare against the Egyptian
state. See: Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of
Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New
York: MacMillan, 1986), pp. 25-29.
4 mamAm al-Bukh_rA, Kit_b al-fitan, madAth, 206.