[1] In many ways, the Draft Social Statement on Human Sexuality
(DSSHS) represents a better theological foundation for a Lutheran
approach to sexual ethics than its predecessors, both contemporary
and historical. In this essay I discuss some of the theo-ethical
benefits of this draft for the ELCA. Yet this draft also has some
problems, two of which will be discussed below.
Responsibility and Trust as Theo-ethical Centers
[2] Many traditional Lutheran approaches to sexuality, including
Luther's, have been grounded in "physicalist natural law"
arguments. By "physicalist" I mean a normative framework based on
biological or physical characteristics of creation or creatures and
known through the observation of the physical world. Those who use
this framework are concerned primarily with the proper physical
structure of creation and derive laws governing human relationships
from this physical structure.[1] Despite a traditional Lutheran theological
distrust of the natural law, this physicalist form of natural law
has often been used by Lutherans to define sexual identity and
legitimate sexual activity according to understandings of gender
derived from physiological criteria.
[3] The DSSHS does not begin with a physicalist natural law
approach as its primary theological foundation for a Lutheran
sexual ethic. Instead, the draft's theological foundation rests on
God's incarnation in Christ and God's reconciling love
given through justification which comes through faith in
Christ. This theological center is described in the first two
sections of the draft, though perhaps the best and most concise
articulation of this theo-ethical center is stated in Lines 63-67.
In these lines, we discover not only the direction of the call for
how we are to live together in sexual relationships, but also the
source of that call, namely the God who loves us and promises
unconditionally that we have been reconciled to God in Christ.
[4] Several benefits for engaging questions of sexual ethics
emerge from this theological center. First, while the statement
does not turn to a physicalist natural law, the DSSHS does
recognize the central place of the incarnation and the resulting
goodness of the human body as created by God (Lines 122-126). Human
sexuality and gender are part of God's creation and were present in
the God who chose to dwell with us as Emmanuel. (Jn 1:14) As
such, the DSSHS recognizes that human sexuality in all of its
genders is good. This is a fairly recent move in the history of the
Christian tradition and an important one. This recognition does not
deny sin but avoids forcing it onto the sexual body; rather, sin is
manifest in the destructive forces found in all human
relationships, including sexual relationships.
[5] Second, by focusing on justification as the source of its
values (Line 316), the draft makes our relationship with God in
Christ the ultimate theological criterion of who we are
and how we are called to live together. Rather than grounding a
sexual ethic in the physiological forms of bodies, the draft works
to focus on human relationships which are first and foremost
defined by our faith-filled relationship with God through Christ.
This focus on justification calls us to construct relational lives
according to faith which then translates into trust and
trustworthiness as we serve the neighbor. In this way, the
quality of our sexual relationships as they are lived out in faith
and trust becomes paramount in following God's will for our sexual
lives.
[6] This call to form trusting and trustworthy relationships
leads the DSSHS to its central ethical criterion for
defining what our sexual relationships ought to look like, namely
responsibility. The focus on responsibility which is grounded in
faith in God represents a welcome change from recent discussions
concerning sexuality in the ELCA which often pit the physical forms
of bodies against the rights of bodies. While human rights and
dignity as God's created image are indeed important aspects of any
Lutheran sexual ethic, these rights are intertwined with our
Christian responsibility to follow God's ongoing call to serve the
neighbor. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer stated, human responsibilities
"spring from these rights themselves, as tasks from gifts. They are
intrinsic to the rights."[2] Thus, the move toward responsibility as a
primary theo-ethical criterion, though tenuously defined, is
another benefit of the DSSHS.
[7] Finally, this draft's focus on human relationship with God
and neighbor opens the door for an important discussion in the last
section of the draft concerning the social aspects of human
sexuality. Because human sexuality is named primarily as a
relational phenomenon (and not merely physical), then individuals,
their relationships and the social world in which they live become
important factors in describing human sexuality and in articulating
responsible sexual being and doing. Consequently, the draft does
well to point to the social world's profound influence on forming
human beings as sexual creatures (Lines 545ff); it also does well
to lift up God's ongoing call to work together responsibly so as to
construct a trustworthy social world where we can live together
safely and joyfully as sexual creatures.
Practicing What Is Preached?
[8] In spite of these theological benefits, however, there are
some problems with the DSSHS as it is currently presented. These
problems can best be seen by asking the question: does the draft
practice what it preaches? In other words, when specific sexual
relationships, sexual behaviors, or sexual ways of being are
described and prescribed, does the draft actually derive its
response from the theology it has proclaimed? Or are there
inconsistencies between theology and practice that need to be
addressed? My answers to these two questions are both "yes." With
regard to the sections on Strong Family, Protecting Children, the
Self, Friendships, and Commitment as well as the final section on
Social Trust, the draft attempts to derive its prescriptions from
God's call to seek trusting and trustworthy relations through
responsible service for the neighbor. In these sections, the
question of whether or not a relationship is trustworthy and built
through responsible behavior seems to be the primary criterion for
regarding a sexual relationship's suitability for life in the body
of Christ.
[9] However, this is not necessarily the case in the sections on
marriage, co-habitation, and same-gender committed relationships.
In these sections, trust and responsibility, while important, are
no longer considered the final criteria for legitimating good
sexual relations; instead, gendered bodies (and the state) become
the final criteria in defining whether or not a particular sexual
relationship is approved by the body of Christ. This sudden course
correction back toward a physicalist natural law is found
explicitly when combining three statements from these
sections:
|
1
.
|
"Marriage is a structure of mutual promises
between a man and a woman blessed by God (Mark 10:7-9) and
authorized in a legal arrangement required by the state." (Lines
1005-7) |
|
2
.
|
"This church does not
favor or give approval to cohabitation arrangements outside of
marriage." (Lines 1072-73) |
|
3
.
|
"This church recognizes the historic origin of the
term 'marriage' as a life-long and committed relationship between a
woman and man, and does not wish to alter this understanding."
(Lines 1151-53)
|
Intended by the draft or not, these three statements join to
shift the draft's theo-ethical framework for deciding which sexual
relationships are justified away from our relationship with God in
Christ (incarnation and justification) toward a physicalist natural
law criterion, namely gender. Taken together, these statements
announce unequivocally that, because it has always done so, the
only relationship the church "approves" or "favors" is marriage
defined as between a man and a woman and as authorized by the
state; according to the second statement (line 1072) no other
relationship, no matter how trusting or responsible, will
be legitimate.
[10] My language of legitimation is specific here.
Peter Berger in The Sacred Canopy
defines legitimation as the social knowledge that "serves to
explain and justify the social order." Legitimations
tell people what is and what ought to be.[3] In the church, a relation is legitimate when
it is communally justified according to the church's theo-ethical
foundations and therefore is valid across the church. By defining
marriage as only between a man and woman (Statement 1); and by
declaring that the church will not change this definition
(Statement 3); and by stating that the church will only favor
and give approval to marriage (Statement 2), the draft,
representing the ELCA's official position, declares that marriage
as defined between a man and woman is the only sexual relationship
legitimated by the church in its doctrine and policy. No other
sexual relation will be endorsed or approved.
[11] This legitimacy, I argue, is derived in the draft according
to gender criteria. As I discuss below, gender is rarely mentioned
throughout most of the draft and "man" and "woman" are never
defined or described. Yet in these three sections, assumed notions
of gender supplant the theo-ethical foundations of trust and
responsibility laid out at the beginning of the document. The call
to reflect God's abiding and unconditional love through
faith-filled and responsible relations and to demonstrate
trustworthiness no longer has priority for the draft when
authorizing sexual relationships, at least concerning who can or
cannot be married. Rather, gender becomes the ultimate legitimating
factor for defining and structuring marriage. In other words, with
respect to marriage, the DSSHS does not practice the theology it
preaches. After lifting up trust, responsibility, service, love,
commitment, care, fidelity, and the beauty of sexual intimacy in
committed sexual relationships, the draft departs from its original
theological foundation and returns to gendered bodies (and the
church/state's view of them) for defining and justifying marriage
as the only valid sexual relationship the ELCA will approve.
[12] This inconsistency between theology and practice emerges
particularly in the draft's response to committed, life-long,
faithful same-gendered relationships that responsibly "reflect
God's love to the world and the vocation to love the neighbor."
(Lines 1108-9) As highlighted by a man at the listening post I
attended, the limitation of the term "marriage" to a woman and man
stands immediately after the draft's suggestion that same-gendered
relationships be "held to the same rigorous standards and sexual
ethics as all others"(Line 1145) and that "dissolution of a
committed same-gender relation be treated with the same gravity as
the dissolution of a marriage" (Line 1148). To demand the same
rigorous standards of and to treat the dissolution of a same-gender
relation like a divorce (a word not mentioned once in the draft) is
to in fact legitimate the relation and to ground it in the trust
and responsibility the draft proclaims as its theological
foundation. Yet, the draft's limitation of the term "marriage" (and
thereby the social legitimacy the word implies) to a relationship
between a woman and man only (in Lines 1151-52) combined with the
church's refusal in the previous section to favor or approve (any)
cohabitation arrangements outside of marriage (1072-3) denies any
public recognition of this legitimacy to same-gender committed,
faithful relationships. This inconsistency materializes, I submit,
because at the same time that the draft is attempting to hold to
its theo-ethical center of responsibility and trust, it is also
trying to maintain a definition of marriage based on assumed
physicalist ideas of gender. This church cannot have it both ways,
and it is cruel to expect same-gendered committed couples to live
according to the church's standards when this church refuses to
give them its public support in its official doctrine, liturgy or
policy.
[13] There is another inconsistency in the draft, one which also
concerns the question of gender. As mentioned above, this draft
rarely discusses gender. When it does, it does so either generally,
without any discussion of how the church currently or historically
has understood the concepts of "male and female," or prescriptively
as the ultimate criterion for defining and structuring marriage.
Yet, who humans are and what we do as sexual creatures is
intimately related to how we understand ourselves and others to be
"male and female." This means that if this church is to offer any
stable framework regarding sexual ethics, it must deal directly
with gender and how the tradition has understood gender, both
positively and negatively. To ignore meanings of "male and female,"
the gender inequalities that still exist in our church and society,
and how these meanings compare to those understood throughout
Christian history is to deny the influence these meanings have on
how men and women today live out their callings responsibly.
[14] For example, many women in our culture tend to view their
responsibility in sexual relationships differently than many men.
This difference became apparent to me in a recent conversation with
some teen-aged women concerning unwanted pregnancy. These young
women articulated a frightening contemporary reality: they
sincerely believed that a woman was the person principally
responsible for saying no to a sexual encounter, for protecting
against unwanted pregnancy during that encounter, and for dealing
with it afterwards. If a girl became pregnant (unless it was rape)
the pregnancy and therefore the sexual activity was entirely her
fault. When I pressed them on this and pointed out that according
to my sex education classes, it takes two to make a baby, these
young women said that they had been taught in their sex
education classes that due to a male's biological make-up, boys/men
are not expected to take as much responsibility for their sexuality
as girls/women are. In essence, these women accepted that they were
the responsible person in any sexual relationship, while their
potential male sexual partners were allowed to abdicate their
responsibility if they so chose due to their biological nature.
[15] What this example illuminates is that men and women will
often understand the term "responsibility" differently when it
comes to their sexual lives. While it is true that both men and
women can be equally responsible or irresponsible in their sexual
behavior, in our contemporary culture greater sexual responsibility
is expected of women while men are not expected to be as sexually
responsible. If the DSSHS proposes to name the theological concept
of "responsibility" as one of its primary criteria for defining and
supporting a Lutheran sexual ethic, it must also explicitly face
the reality that in our society men and women hear and experience
calls to sexual responsibility differently.[4]
[16] One response to this critique might be: "that's too much
for one social statement to handle." I agree that to include a
detailed theological discussion of gender in this statement would
require too much from the statement. However, to exclude gender
completely is to render the draft ineffectual. This church will
never have a helpful sexuality statement if it does not engage
questions of gender more deeply, and it cannot wait for a future
statement on sexism to arrive years from now. Gender matters to how
human sexuality is lived in the world today, all too often (though
not only) to the detriment of women. In the DSSHS, the only
place gender enters the discussion in any meaningful way is as the
final criterion for defining marriage and it does so without any
definition or explanation. However, where it should join the
discussion (e.g., in understanding theological concepts of trust
and responsibility or in discussing practical sexual issues such as
inequality, exploitation, sexual assault, teen pregnancy,
pornography, etc.) gender is mentioned only in passing. In other
words, the church demands that gender determine which sexual
relationships are legitimate while at the same time refusing to
face the real problems of inequality that traditional and current
theological understandings of gender create within those sexual
relationships.
[17] Consequently, for these reasons (and many more), gender
should not be ignored nor should any equality between the genders
be assumed in the ELCA's statement on sexuality. To assume gender
equality in either description or ethical prescription (as the
draft seems to) when in fact gender inequality is at the root of
many of the ethical issues articulated throughout the document
prevents the church from creating a helpful statement on sexuality
while also tragically perpetuating the problems of gender
inequality and its consequences against which the draft purports to
want to work (Lines 1264, 1379). Instead the future sexuality
statement ought to at the very least include a discussion of how
traditional understandings of gender in the church have damaged
individuals, both male and female, as well as how those
understandings have both negatively and positively influenced the
church's approach to sexuality and sexual ethics. The future
statement also ought to take much more seriously questions
regarding what it means to be created "male and female" and how the
church should practically live out its own calling to encourage
responsible and trust-worthy sexual relationships by understanding
"male and female" more faithfully and equitably.
[18] To conclude, before this statement can be a guide for the
ELCA, it must address these inconsistencies honestly so that it
faithfully practice what it preaches. Only by doing so will the
statement function as it hopes: as a teaching document that serves
as a "framework" which offers "guideposts" and "markers" that can
"direct the church's discernment." (Lines 27-32; 44)
[1]
For more on the term "physicalist" as understood from a Roman
Catholic natural law perspective see Richard M. Gula, Reason
Informed by Faith: Foundations of a Catholic Morality (New
York: Paulist Press, 1989), especially Chapter 15, "The Natural Law
in Tradition" and Chapter 16, "Natural Law Today."
[2]
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. and trans. by Clifford
Green (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005)
180ff.
[3]
Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York: Anchor
Books, 1967) 29.
[4]
The same could be said for the concept of "trust," especially in
a culture where a greater number of women than men have been
sexually assaulted. Any sexual assault is a horrible sin, but the
differences in the experience of this threat will lead women to
hear the call to trust and trustworthiness in their sexual
relationships very differently than men.
© July 2008
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 8, Issue 7