The United States Military and 9/11
[1] The war on terrorism opened a new chapter in U.S. military
history, and the debate on strategies used to prosecute this war
has just begun.
[2] A review of U.S. military strategy and the forces needed to
execute that strategy began shortly after the inauguration of the
Bush administration. The review recognized that future conflicts
would be very different from the past. With the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact and the success of arms control measures, crisis
stability had been replaced by regional instability. U.S. forces
were likely to be called on in distant places; they would have to
be lighter and faster if they were to respond in a timely manner to
smaller conflicts. The disaster of 9/11 confirmed the need for
smaller, faster, adaptive forces as the focus became the Taliban
and al-Qaeda.
[3] In addition to the restructuring of the armed forces, the
civilian and military leadership face two practical ethical
problems today that emerged after 9/11. Both have ethical
considerations that merit debate. The U.S., in actions subsequent
to 9/11, declared war against an entity other than a sovereign
nation. We are at war against terrorism,"terrorists and those that
harbor them" in the president's words. Although our forces have
fought in Afghanistan, we are not at war with that country. The
current government of Afghanistan generally supports our efforts
within their borders. However, if we are to pursue terrorists,
wherever they are, and those that harbor them, we could find
ourselves in other countries while not at war with those countries.
The policy, particularly when forcefully delivered to the joint
session of Congress and the American people in the heat of post
9/11, sounded just right. However, the execution of the
accompanying strategy will raise many questions. What happens if a
country says "no," you may not violate our sovereignty? Does our
military go in anyway?"; does "the end justify the means?"
[4] The other ethical problem arises out of the discussion about
the possibility of attacking Iraq. The policy of containment may be
replaced in this instance by a preemptive declaration of war.
Historically, the U.S. has responded to aggression but refrained
from preemptive attacks. Nuclear deterrence was successful, in
part, because both superpowers considered the other rational and
would therefore not initiate an attack. (It should be noted that in
today's world, not all those who may obtain nuclear weapons are
deemed rational in the same way.) An attack on any NATO ally would
have been considered an attack against all, and swift retaliation
was promised. The Gulf war of '91 was in response to aggressive
military action by Iraq against Kuwait. Unless one considers the
war of '91 simply unfinished, the case against Iraq today is quite
different. Although there may be a significant threat posed by
Iraq's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, there has not
been, since 1991, an aggressive act by Iraq that calls for a U.S.
response. Thus, a preemptive strike by the U.S. would represent a
significant change in U.S. policy. What justification is there for
this type of action? What does this signal to other countries that
have undesirable leaders and weapons of mass destruction? The
discussion, having many dimensions, has just begun.