[1] Jean Bethke Elshtain's Just War against
Terror is her response to the attacks of September 11,
2001. The original publication date was 2003, and the most
recent edition also contains analysis of the initial prosecution of
the Iraq war. Elshtain's analysis is pursued from the
perspective of "just war theory," a theory that finds its origin in
the theology of Augustine, particularly in The City of
God. Briefly, just war theory states that not only are
there times when it is necessary to go to war, but also times when
it is right to go to war (and conversely wrong not to go to
war). Chief among the reasons why a war might be justly
pursued are a nation's self-defense, to secure sufficient civic
peace for the proper functioning of a nation, and the protection of
innocent life. Medieval thinkers following Augustine codified
these principles and added additional prudential concerns, such as,
use of war as a last resort, the ability to win the war, and most
importantly the distinction between soldiers and civilians.
Just war theory was the predominant way of thinking about war
throughout the Medieval and Early Modern period. It was
foundational for international jurists such as Grotius, and reached
its apex in Clausewitz's treatise on war.
[2] With the tremendous weight of historical and
theoretical precedent behind her, Elshtain argues that not only was
the U.S. response to 9/11 necessary, but it was right.
Furthermore, while the war in Iraq may not have been necessary, it
was still right. Elshtain makes a strong case for her
position by showing how American actions following 9/11 fit
squarely within the just war tradition, and also by criticizing
those who take an opposing view. In the first instance her
work is clear and scholarly. In the second instance, though,
her criticisms often seem to miss the mark. For example,
Elshtain writes:
People who routinely insist
on the illegitimacy of blaming victims now do it. No one
deserved what happened to them on September 11, neither the
immediate victims and their families nor the country itself.
Cannot a powerful country bleed? Are not its citizens as
mortal as those anywhere? Simple human recognition along
these lines does not deter the literary theorist Frederic Jameson
from seeing in these horrific events "a textbook example of
dialectical reversal." Rather, what we are being treated to
in such comments is a textbook example of what Hannah Arendt called
the handy magic of "the dialectic," which puts "to sleep our common
sense, which is nothing else but our mental organ for perceiving,
understanding, and dealing with reality and factuality"
(93-4).
It does not seem to follow from the fact that Jameson called the
events of 9/11 "a textbook example of dialectical reversal" that he
lacks "simple human recognition." Understanding events within
a theoretical framework (in Jameson's case Marxist) in no way
precludes an understanding of the human costs of terrorists
attacks. Elshtain would seem to agree since the first chapter
of the book outlines the theoretical framework within which she
views the events of 9/11. Furthermore, it seems incumbent on
Elshtain to demonstrate that Arendt and Jameson are talking about
the same "dialectic" in order for Arendt's zinger to stick.
Or, if Elshtain wants to claim that all uses of dialectic (whether
Platonic, Hegelian, or Marxist) are absurd, this too would need to
be argued for. While I have a great deal of respect for
Arendt, her dislike of a position does not automatically make it
ridiculous.
[3] Elshtain continues to cast opposing positions
uncharitably. A few pages after the above quote, she again
returns to Jameson in discussing the difference between academics
and politicians:
Unlike those who specialize
in the verbal equivalent of a hit-and-run accident, politicians
cannot evade responsibility for their words and deeds. They
cannot talk blithely about "blowback" and "dialectical reversals"
and "imperial retaliatory terrorism" when a country and its people
face biological, chemical, and nuclear attack-not to mention
explosions and suicide assaults (97).
What concerns me about the above paragraph is the use of the
word "blithely." Jameson's blitheness has neither been proved
nor disproved. All Elshtain provides is an uncited phrase
without any context. Notice how the meaning of the sentence
changes when "blithely" is removed. I see no reason why a
politician or academic could not or should not talk about 9/11 from
as many perspectives and from as many theoretical frameworks as
possible. I agree that no one should discuss it "blithely,"
but Elshtain has not demonstrated that anyone has.
[4] I am dwelling on this point at length, because I think
it points to a larger problem in Elshtain's book as a whole.
Throughout Just War against Terror, Elshtain seems to
conflate explanation and justification. As a result, any
attempt to understand why someone would fly passenger jets into
buildings appears to be saying that such an attack is
justified. Without understanding or explanation, however, it
seems that we risk increasing the likelihood of future attacks
rather than mitigating it. Thus, Elshtain writes:
Repeatedly the worst
possible gloss is put on American motivations and the best on the
motivations of those who attacked us. Terrorists are given
the benefit of the doubt. After the obligatory caveat that it
is not a good thing to fly hijacked commercial aircraft into
skyscraper office buildings, we are told to consider the
provocations. These range from "the fascism of U.S. foreign
policy over the past many decades," in the words of a Rutgers
professor cited by Andrew Sullivan, to the historian Mary Beard's
declaration that, "however tactfully you dress it up, the United
States had it coming" (93).
Leaving aside legitimate concerns that one might have about
American motivations in the international community, it is clear
that those who attacked the U.S. on 9/11 had already put the "worst
possible gloss" on American motivations. In an effort to
understand the hijackers, it seems prudent to think about the U.S.
in the way that they do, and then ask why they might think about
the U.S. in this way. The phrase "obligatory caveat" seems to
impugn unnecessarily the motives of those trying to explain what
sort of historical forces led to the 9/11 attacks. It seems
much more amenable to a continuing dialogue about the U.S. role in
international affairs to assume that these "obligatory caveats" are
sincere, and the concern for understanding seeks prevention rather
than provocation.
[5] As I noted above, Just War Against Terror
presents a powerful argument that the U.S. was right to go to war
in Afghanistan and Iraq. I would like to call into question
one of the key presuppositions of the argument, namely that just
war theory can be appropriately applied in this instance. In
particular, I do not think that there can be strictly speaking a
"war" on "terror." I am not the first person to make this
claim. The recently released report of the 9/11 commission
makes a similar claim. "Terrorism" is a technique that seeks
political or social change through the unpredictable and
indiscriminate killing or injuring of noncombatants.
Terrorism is an effective technique because it is so
efficient. One attack can create great upheaval and the
threat of future attacks is nearly as effective as the original
attack. Given that terrorism is a technique, it does not seem
that a war can be fought against it. Terrorism is not a state
that can agree to terms of surrender, nor is it a combatant that
can be killed or captured on the field of battle. When U.S.
troops landed in Afghanistan and Iraq, the people that fought
against them were not defending terrorism, they were defending
their country or their religion or both. When there are
protests against the use of military force in the "war on terror,"
the protesters are not protesting on behalf of terror, or in the
hopes that without military intervention terror might
flourish.
[6] I would draw a parallel by comparing another
technique, land mines. It is generally agreed upon by the
international community that land mines are an inappropriate
technique to use. Long after the war in which they are
deployed is over, they continue to kill and maim. The
solution to this problem, however, is not to declare a war on land
mines. Rather, one enjoins the members of the international
community to ban the use of land mines, and seeks funding for their
removal from past conflicts. In the same way that one cannot
declare a war on land mines, it seems that neither can terror be
the proper object of a war. Obviously, terrorism is a much
more complicated issue. Terrorism is roundly condemned by the
international community as an inappropriate technique for effecting
political and social change. The problem is those who use
terrorism are by and large outside of and hostile to the
international community. This refusal of international
citizenship by those who employ terrorism, however, does not make a
war against the technique any more plausible.
[7] The nature of those who employ terrorism points to
another difficulty in applying just war theory. Just war
theory is very good at putting limits on the relations between
states. However, it becomes increasingly murky and difficult
to apply when the agents are not acting on behalf of a state.
Just war theory marks the limit of relations between states, but is
not a delicate enough instrument to draw the contours of
multinational, sub-state organizations such as Al-Qaeda. It
seems as if this can only be done through international cooperation
and careful intelligence gathering. In short, there cannot be
a just war on terror, because just war theory applies to states,
not sub-state actors, and terrorism is a technique amenable to
sanction but not war.
[8] I would like to conclude with two claims that I think
we can all agree on, and some difficult questions that we are all
struggling to answer:
The first [claim] is just
what I assume to be recognition of fact. That is that the
events of September 11 were a horrendous atrocity, probably the
most devastating instant human toll of any crime in history,
outside of war. The second [claim] has to do with the goals.
I'm assuming that our goal is that we are interested in
reducing the likelihood of such crimes whether they are against us
or against someone else.[1]
[9] Given the atrocities of 9/11, what is the best way to
prevent future attacks? Is the way that we are prosecuting
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq increasing or decreasing the
likelihood of attack? If it is increasing the likelihood of
attack, what are the alternatives? Can democracy legitimately
be imposed by force? The great virtue of Elshtain's Just
War Against Terror is that it forces these questions on
us. We will be working out answers to these questions for
decades to come.
See Elshtain's
response.
© October 2004
Journal of Lutheran Ethics (JLE)
Volume 4, Issue 10
[1] Noam Chomsky, "The New War Against
Terror," http://www.zmag.org/GlobalWatch/chomskymit.htm.